A Model of Information Security and Competition

References

• Acemoglu D, Malekian A, Ozdaglar A (2016) Network security and contagion. J. Econom. Theory 166:536–585.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Anderson SP, Coate S (2005) Market provision of broadcasting: A welfare analysis. Rev. Econom. Stud. 72(4):947–972.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Anderson R, Moore T (2006) The economics of information security. Science 314(5799):610–613.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Arce DG (2018) Malware and market share. J. Cybersecurity 4(1):1–6.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Arce DG (2020) Cybersecurity and platform competition in the cloud. Comput. Security 93:1–9.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Arora A, Forman C, Nandkumar A, Telang R (2010) Competition and patching of security vulnerabilities: An empirical analysis. Inform. Econom. Policy 22(2):164–177.Crossref, Google Scholar
• August T, Tunca TI (2006) Network software security and user incentives. Management Sci. 52(11):1703–1720.Link, Google Scholar
• August T, Niculescu MF, Shin H (2014) Cloud implications on software network structure and security risks. Inform. Systems Res. 25(3):489–510.Link, Google Scholar
• Becker GS (1968) Crime and punishment: An economic approach. J. Political Econom. 76(2):169–217.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Cavusoglu H, Mishra B, Raghunathan S (2004) The effect of Internet security breach announcements on market value: Capital market reactions for breached firms and Internet security developers. Internat. J. Electronic Commerce 9(1):70–104.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Choi JP, Fershtman C, Gandal N (2010) Network security: Vulnerabilities and disclosure policy. J. Indust. Econom. 58(4):868–894.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Dey D, Lahiri A, Zhang G (2012) Hacker behavior, network effects, and the security software market. J. Management Inform. Systems 29(2):77–108.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Dziubiński M, Goyal S (2017) How do you defend a network? Theoret. Econom. 12(1):331–376.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Fabrizi S, Lippert S, Rodrigues-Neto JA (2019) Attack, defense, and the market for protection. Working paper, University of Auckland, Auckland, New Zealand.Google Scholar
• Fainmesser IP, Galeotti A, Momot R (2022) Digital privacy. Management Sci. 69(6):3157–3173.Google Scholar
• Fedele A, Roner C (2022) Dangerous games: A literature review on cybersecurity investments. J. Econom. Surveys 36(1):157–187.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Gal-Or E, Ghose A (2005) The economic incentives for sharing security information. Inform. Systems Res. 16(2):186–208.Link, Google Scholar
• Garcia A, Horowitz B (2007) The potential for underinvestment in Internet security: Implications for regulatory policy. J. Regulatory Econom. 31(1):37–55.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Geer D, Jardine E, Leverett E (2020) On market concentration and cybersecurity risk. J. Cyber Policy 5(1):9–29.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Gordon LA, Loeb MP (2002) The economics of information security investment. ACM Trans. Inform. System Security 5(4):438–457.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Gordon LA, Loeb MP, Lucyshyn W (2003) Sharing information on computer systems security: An economic analysis. J. Accounting Public Policy 22(6):461–485.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Goyal S, Vigier A (2014) Attack, defence, and contagion in networks. Rev. Econom. Stud. 81(4):1518–1542.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Hirschleifer J (1983) From weakest-link to best-shot: The voluntary provision of public goods. Public Choice 41(3):371–386.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Jo AM (2017) The effect of competition intensity on software security-an empirical analysis of security patch release on the web browser market. Proc. 16th Annual Workshop Econom. Inform. Security (WEIS 2017) (San Diego), 1–31.Google Scholar
• Johari R, Weintraub GY, Van Roy B (2010) Investment and market structure in industries with congestion. Oper. Res. 58(5):1303–1317.Link, Google Scholar
• Jullien B, Lefouili Y, Riordan MH (2020) Privacy protection, security, and consumer retention. Working paper, Toulouse School of Economics, Toulouse, France.Google Scholar
• Lam WMW (2016) Attack-prevention and damage-control investments in cybersecurity. Inform. Econom. Policy 37:42–51.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Liu Y, Yildirim P, Zhang ZJ (2022) Implications of revenue models and technology for content moderation strategies. Marketing Sci. 41(4):831–847.Link, Google Scholar
• Moore T, Clayton R, Anderson R (2009) The economics of online crime. J. Econom. Perspect. 23(3):3–20.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Nagler MG (2011) Negative externalities, competition and consumer choice. J. Indust. Econom. 59(3):396–421.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Navon A, Shy O, Thisse JF (1995) Product differentiation in the presence of positive and negative network effects. CEPR Discussion Paper No. 1306, Centre for Economic Policy Research, London.Google Scholar
• Pierce JC (2016) Shifting data breach liability: A congressional approach. William Mary Law Rev. 53(3):975–1017.Google Scholar
• Ransbotham S, Mitra S (2009) Choice and chance: A conceptual model of paths to information security compromise. Inform. Systems Res. 20(1):121–139.Link, Google Scholar
• Schechter SE, Smith MD (2003) How much security is enough to stop a thief? The economics of outsider theft via computer systems and networks. Wright RN, ed. Financial Cryptography. FC 2003, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 2742 (Springer-Verlag, Berlin), 122–137.Google Scholar
• Toh YL (2017) Incentivizing firms to protect consumer data: Can reputation play a (bigger) role? Working paper, Toulouse School of Economics, Toulouse, France.Google Scholar
• Varian H (2004) System reliability and free riding. Camp LJ, Lewis S, eds. Economics of Information Security. Advances in Information Security, vol. 12 (Springer, Boston), 1–15.Crossref, Google Scholar