Effective Matrices, Decision Frames, and Cooperation in Volunteer Dilemmas: A Theoretical Perspective on Academic Peer Review

Published Online:https://doi.org/10.1287/orsc.1100.0607

Academic journal reviewing is a form of collective action that creates a public good, and as such, it represents a social dilemma with cooperation being essential to the reviewing process. Cooperation in this social dilemma is a function of the perceived costs and benefits to the potential reviewer. However, those perceived costs and benefits are personally perceived and in turn may be influenced by the frame reviewers bring to the decision to review. Frames may differ in the extent to which they lead reviewing to be viewed as an in-role duty or an extra-role choice, and the extent to which they lead reviewers to focus only on consequences to the self or consequences to others as well. Also critical in this dilemma are the frames of editors who must invite participation by reviewers and the frames of universities who legitimate reviewer behaviors. Some “obvious” solutions to the volunteer dilemma of reviewing may have paradoxical effects on reviewer cooperation if such frames are not considered. The importance of frame analysis for understanding volunteer dilemmas is addressed.

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