Conditioning Prices on Purchase History

References

• Acquisti Alessandro. Essays on privacy, anonymity, and tracking in computer-mediated economic transactions. (2003) . Ph.D. thesis, University of California, Berkeley, Berkeley, CAGoogle Scholar
• Bailey Joseph P. Internet price discrimination: Self-regulation, public policy, and global electronic commerce. (1998) . Technical report, The Robert H. Smith School of Business, University of Maryland, College Park, MDGoogle Scholar
• Blattberg Robert C., Deighton John. Interactive marketing: exploiting the age of addressability. Sloan Management Rev. (1991) 33(1):5–14Google Scholar
• Calzolari Giacomo, Pavan Alessandro. Optimal design of privacy policies. (2001) . Technical report, Gremaq, University of Toulouse, Toulouse, FranceGoogle Scholar
• Chen Yuxin, Iyer Ganesh. Consumer addressability and customized pricing. Marketing Sci. (2002) 21(2):197–208Link, Google Scholar
• Chen Yuxin, Zhang Z. John. Competitive targeted pricing with strategic customers. (2001) . Technical report, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, New York University, and Columbia Business School, New YorkGoogle Scholar
• Chen Yuxin, Narasimhan Chakravarthi, Zhang Z. John. Individual marketing with imperfect targetability. Marketing Sci. (2001) 20(1):23–41Link, Google Scholar
• Dayal Sandeep, Landesberg Helene, Zeisser Michael. Building trust online. McKinsey Quart. (2001) 4Google Scholar
• Economist Amazon, the software company. (2001) Google Scholar
• Elsner Ralf, Krafft Manfred, Huchzermeier Arnd. Optimizing Rhenania’s direct marketing business through dynamic multilevel modeling (DMLM) in a multicatalog-brand environment. Marketing Sci. (2004) 23(2):192–206Link, Google Scholar
• Freixas Xavier, Guesnerie Roger, Tirole Jean. Planning under incomplete information and the ratchet effect. Rev. Econom. Stud. (1985) 52(2):173–191Crossref, Google Scholar
• Fudenberg Drew, Tirole Jean. Game Theory (1991) (MIT Press, Cambridge, MA) Google Scholar
• Fudenberg Drew, Tirole Jean. Upgrades, trade-ins, and buy-backs. RAND J. Econom. (1998) 29(2):238–258Crossref, Google Scholar
• Fudenberg Drew, Tirole Jean. Customer poaching and brand switching. RAND J. Econom. (2000) 31(4):634–657Crossref, Google Scholar
• Goolsbee Austan, Chevalier Judith. Price competition online: Amazon vs. Barnes and Noble. Quant. Marketing Econom. (2003) 1(2):203–222Crossref, Google Scholar
• Hart Oliver D., Tirole Jean. Contract renegotiation and Coasian dynamics. Rev. Econom. Stud. (1988) 55(4):509–540Crossref, Google Scholar
• Kim Byung-Do, Shi Mengze, Srinivasan Kannan. Reward programs and tacit collusion. Marketing Sci. (2001) 20(2):99–120Link, Google Scholar
• Klemperer Paul. Price wars caused by switching costs. Rev. Econom. Stud. (1989) 56(3):405–420Crossref, Google Scholar
• Klemperer Paul. Competition when consumers have switching costs: an overview with applications to industrial organization, macroeconomics and international trade. Rev. Econom. Stud. (1995) 62(4):515–539Crossref, Google Scholar
• Maskin Eric, Riley John. Monopoly with incomplete information. RAND J. Econom. (1984) 15(2):171–196Crossref, Google Scholar
• McCulloch Robert E., Rossi Peter E., Allenby Greg M. The value of purchase history data in target marketing. Marketing Sci. (1996) 15(4):321–340Link, Google Scholar
• Montgomery Alan L., Li Shibo, Srinivasan Kannan, Liechty John C. Modeling online browsing and path analysis using clickstream data. Marketing Sci. (2004) 23(4):579–595Link, Google Scholar
• Riley John, Zeckhauser Richard. Optimal selling strategies: when to haggle, when to hold firm. Quart. J. Econom. (1983) 98(2):267–289Crossref, Google Scholar
• Rossi Peter E., Allenby G. M. Marketing models of consumer heterogeneity. J. Econometrics (1999) 89(1–2):57–78Google Scholar
• Salant Stephen W. When is inducing self-selection suboptimal for a monopolist? Quart. J. Econom. (1989) 104(2):391–397Crossref, Google Scholar
• Schartz John. Giving the Web a memory cost its users privacy. New York Times (2001) September 4). http://www.nytimes.com/2001/09/04/technology/04COOK.htmlGoogle Scholar
• Stokey Nancy. Intertemporal price discrimination. Quart. J. Econom. (1979) 93(3):355–371Crossref, Google Scholar
• Streifeld David. On the Web price tags blur: what you pay could depend on who you are. The Washington Post (2000) September 27Google Scholar
• Taylor Curtis R. Consumer privacy and the market for customer information. RAND J. Econom. (2004) 35(4):631–651Crossref, Google Scholar
• Ulph David, Vulkan Nir. Electronic commerce and competitive first-degree price discrimination. (2000) . Technical report, University College, London, UKGoogle Scholar
• Ulph David, Vulkan Nir. E-commerce, mass customization and price discrimination. (2001) . Technical report, University College, London, UKGoogle Scholar
• Varian Hal R. Price discrimination and social welfare. Amer. Econom. Rev. (1985) 75(4):870–875Google Scholar
• Villas-Boas J. Miguel. Dynamic competition with customer recognition. RAND J. Econom. (1999) 30(4):604–631Crossref, Google Scholar
• Villas-Boas J. Miguel. Price cycles in markets with customer recognition. RAND J. Econom. (2004) 35(3):486–501Crossref, Google Scholar
• Weitzman Martin. The “ratchet principle” and performance incentives. Bell J. Econom. (1980) 11(1):302–308Crossref, Google Scholar