Information Sharing in a Channel with Partially Informed Retailers

References

• Basar T., Ho Y.-C. Informational properties of the Nash solutions of two stochastic nonzero-sum games. J. Econom. Theory (1974) 7(4):370–387Crossref, Google Scholar
• Beckham D. Emulating Wal-Mart. Health Forum J. (2002) 45(4):37–39Google Scholar
• Blattberg R. C., Fox E. J.Category Management: Getting Started, Guide 1 (1995) (Research Department, Food Marketing Institute, Washington, D.C.) Google Scholar
• Boyle M. The Wegman's way. Fortune (2005) January 25):62–68Google Scholar
• Cachon G. P., Fisher M. Supply chain inventory management and the value of shared information. Management Sci. (2000) 46(8):1032–1048Link, Google Scholar
• Caldieraro F., Coughlan A. T. Spiffed-up channels: The role of spiffs in hierarchical selling organizations. Marketing Sci. (2007) 26(1):31–51Link, Google Scholar
• DeGroot M.Optimal Statistical Decisions (1970) (McGraw-Hill, New York) Google Scholar
• Desrochers D. M., Gundlach G. T., Foer A. A. Analysis of antitrust challenges to category captain arrangements. J. Public Policy & Marketing (2003) 22(1):201–215Crossref, Google Scholar
• Dukes J. A., Gal-Or E., Srinivasan K. Channel bargaining with retailer asymmetry. J. Marketing Res. (2006) 43(1):84–97Crossref, Google Scholar
• Gal-Or E. Information sharing in oligopoly. Econometrica (1985) 53(2):329–344Crossref, Google Scholar
• Gal-Or E. First mover disadvantages with private information. Rev. Econom. Stud. (1987) 54:279–292Crossref, Google Scholar
• Gavirneni S., Kapuscinski R., Tayur S. Value of information in capacitated supply chains. Management Sci. (1999) 45(1):16–24Link, Google Scholar
• Geylani T., Dukes A. J., Srinivasan K. Strategic manufacturer response to a dominant retailer. Marketing Sci. (2007) 26(2):164–178Link, Google Scholar
• He C., Marklund J., Vossen T. Vertical information sharing in a volatile market. Marketing Sci. (2007) . ForthcomingGoogle Scholar
• Hill S. Dream the impossible. Apparel Indust. (2000) 61(4):12–17Google Scholar
• Iyer G., Villas-Boas J. M. A bargaining theory of distribution channels. J. Marketing Res. (2003) 40(1):80–100Crossref, Google Scholar
• JDA Enterprise Building a better business. JDA Enterprise (2002) January/February):5–6Google Scholar
• Jeuland A. P., Shugan S. M. Managing channel profits. Marketing Sci. (1983) 2(3):239–272Link, Google Scholar
• Lee H. L., Padmanabhan V., Whang S. The bullwhip effect in supply chains. Sloan Management Rev. (1997) 38(3):93–102Google Scholar
• Lee H. L., So K. C., Tang C. S. The value of information sharing in a two-level supply chain. Management Sci. (2000) 46(5):626–643Link, Google Scholar
• Li L. Cournot oligopoly with information sharing. RAND J. Econom. (1985) 16(4):521–536Crossref, Google Scholar
• Li L. Information sharing in a supply chain with horizontal competition. Management Sci. (2002) 48(9):1196–1212Link, Google Scholar
• Luo L., Kannan P. K., Ratchford B. T. New product development under channel acceptance. Marketing Sci. (2007) 26(2):149–163Link, Google Scholar
• Milgrom P., Roberts J. Limit pricing and entry under incomplete information: An equilibrium analysis. Econometrica (1982) 50(2):443–459Crossref, Google Scholar
• Min S., Roath A. S., Daugherty P. J., Genchev S. E., Chen H., Arndt A. D. Supply chain collaboration: What's happening? Internat. J. Logist. Management (2005) 16(2):237–256Crossref, Google Scholar
• Nelson E. Retailing: Why Wal-Mart sings, “yes, we have bananas”. Wall Street J. (1998) October 6):B1Google Scholar
• Niraj R., Narasimhan C. Vertical information sharing in distribution. (2002) . Working paper, Washington University in St. Louis, St. Louis, MOGoogle Scholar
• Novshek W., Sonnenschein H. Fulfilled expectations Cournot duopoly with information acquisition and release. Bell J. Econom. (1982) 13(1):214–218Crossref, Google Scholar
• Radhakrishnan S., Srinidhi B. Sharing demand information in a value chain: Implications for pricing and profitability. Rev. Quant. Finance and Accounting (2005) 24:23–45Crossref, Google Scholar
• Radner R. Team decision problems. Ann. Math. Statist. (1962) 33:857–881Crossref, Google Scholar
• Raghunathan S. Information sharing in a supply chain: A note on its value when demand is nonstationary. Management Sci. (2001) 47(4):605–610Link, Google Scholar
• Raju J. S., Roy A. Market information and firm performance. Management Sci. (2000) 46(8):1075–1084Link, Google Scholar
• Raju J. S., Zhang Z. J. Channel coordination in the presence of a dominant retailer. Marketing Sci. (2005) 24(2):254–262Link, Google Scholar
• Rubinstein A. Perfect equilibrium in a bargaining model. Econometrica (1982) 50(1):97–110Crossref, Google Scholar
• Seifert D.Collaborative Planning, Forecasting, and Replenishment: How to Create a Supply Chain Advantage (2003) (AMACOM, Division of the American Management Association, New York) Google Scholar
• Småros J. Collaborative forecasting: A selection of practical approaches. Internat. J. Logist.: Res. Appl. (2003) 6(4):245–258Crossref, Google Scholar
• Spence M. Job market signaling. Quart. J. Econom. (1973) 87(3):355–374Crossref, Google Scholar
• VICS Nabisco Inc. and Wegmans food markets case. (1999) . http://www.vics.org/guidelines/cpfr_roadmap_case_studies. [Accessed December 27, 2006.]Google Scholar
• Villas-Boas J. M. Sleeping with the enemy: Should competitors share the same advertising agency? Marketing Sci. (1994) 13(2):190–202Link, Google Scholar
• Vives X. Duopoly information equilibrium: Cournot and Bertrand. J. Econom. Theory (1984) 34:71–94Crossref, Google Scholar
• Vives X.Oligopoly Pricing: Old Ideas and New Tools (1999) (MIT Press, Cambridge, MA) Google Scholar