Why Do Salespeople Spend So Much Time Lobbying for Low Prices?

Published Online:https://doi.org/10.1287/mksc.2014.0856

References

  • Anderson E (1985) The salesperson as outside agent or employee: A transaction cost analysis. Marketing Sci. 4(3):234–254.LinkGoogle Scholar
  • Baker WL, Marn MV, Zawada CC (2010) The Price Advantage (John Wiley & Sons, Hoboken, NJ).CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Basu AK, Lal R, Srinivasan V, Staelin R (1985) Salesforce compensation plans: An agency theoretic perspective. Marketing Sci. 4(4):267–291.LinkGoogle Scholar
  • Bergmann R, Friedl G (2008) Controlling innovative projects with moral hazard and adverse selection. Res. Policy 37(9):1504–1514.CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Bester H, Krähmer D (2008) Delegation and incentives. RAND J. Econom. 39(3):664–682.CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Bhardwaj P (2001) Delegating pricing decisions. Marketing Sci. 20(2):143–169.LinkGoogle Scholar
  • Coughlan A, Narasimhan C (1992) An empirical analysis of salesforce compensation plans. J. Bus. 65(1):93–121.CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Crainer S, Dearlove D (2004) Financial Times Handbook of Management (Financial Times/Prentice Hall, Upper Saddle River, NJ).Google Scholar
  • Dietmeyer B (2004) Strategic Negotiation: A Breakthrough Four-Step Process for Effective Business Negotiation (Dearborn Trade Publishing, Chicago).Google Scholar
  • Godes D (2003) In the eye of the beholder: An analysis of the relative value of a top sales rep across firms and products. Marketing Sci. 22(2):161–187 LinkGoogle Scholar
  • Joseph K (2001) On the optimality of delegating pricing authority to the sales force. J. Marketing 65(1):62–70.CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Kalra A, Shi M (2001) Designing optimal sales contests: A theoretical perspective. Marketing Sci. 20(2):170–193.LinkGoogle Scholar
  • Kalra A, Shi M, Srinivasan K (2003) Salesforce compensation scheme and consumer inferences. Management Sci. 49(5):655–672.LinkGoogle Scholar
  • Kotler P, Rackham N, Krishnaswamy S (2006) Ending the war between sales and marketing. Harvard Business Review reprint, R0607E (Harvard Business School Publishing, Cambridge MA).Google Scholar
  • Laffont J-J, Martimort D (2002) The Theory of Incentives: The Principal-Agent Model (Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ).CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Lal R (1986) Delegating pricing responsibility to the salesforce. Marketing Sci. 5(2):159–168.LinkGoogle Scholar
  • Lal R, Staelin R (1986) Salesforce compensation plans in environments with asymmetric information. Marketing Sci. 5(3):179–198.LinkGoogle Scholar
  • Laux V (2008) On the value of influence activities for capital budgeting. J. Econom. Behav. Organ. 65(3–4):625–635.CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Lim N (2010) Social loss aversion and optimal contest design. J. Marketing Res. 47(4):777–787.CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Lim N, Ham SH (2013) Relationship organizations and price delegation: An experimental study. Management Sci. 60(3):586–605.LinkGoogle Scholar
  • Lim N, Ahearne MJ, Ham SH (2009) Designing sales contests: Does the prize structure matter? J. Marketing Res. 46(3):356–371.CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Mantrala M, Albers S, Caldieraro F, Jensen O, Joseph K, Krafft M, Narasimhan Cet al. (2010) Sales force modeling: State of the field and research agenda. Marketing Lett. 21(3):255–272.CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Meehan J, Simonetto M, Montan L, Goodin C (2011) Pricing and Profitability Management: A Practical Guide for Business Leaders (John Wiley & Sons, Hoboken, NJ).Google Scholar
  • Meyer M, Milgrom P, Roberts J (1992) Organizational prospects, influence costs, and ownership changes. J. Econom. Management Strategy 1(1):9–35.CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Milgrom PR (1988) Employment contracts, influence activities, and efficient organization design. J. Political Econom. 96(1):42–60.CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Miller TG, Gist EP (2003) Selling in Turbulent Times (Accenture-Economist Intelligence Unit Survey, New York).Google Scholar
  • Mishra BK, Prasad A (2004) Centralized pricing versus delegating pricing to the salesforce under information asymmetry. Marketing Sci. 23(1):21–27.LinkGoogle Scholar
  • Mishra BK, Prasad A (2005) Delegating pricing decisions in competitive markets with symmetric and asymmetric information. Marketing Sci. 24(3):490–497.LinkGoogle Scholar
  • Misra S, Nair H (2011) A structural model of sales-force compensation dynamics: Estimation and field implementation. Quant. Marketing Econom. 9(3):211–257.CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Raju JS, Srinivasan V (1996) Quota-based compensation plans for multiterritory heterogeneous salesforces. Management Sci. 42(10):1454–1462.LinkGoogle Scholar
  • Rao RC (1990) Compensating heterogeneous salesforces: Some explicit solutions. Marketing Sci. 9(4):319–341.LinkGoogle Scholar
  • Rogers B (2011) Rethinking Sales Management: A Strategic Guide for Practitioners, Google eBook ed., Feb 15 (John Wiley & Sons, Hoboken, NJ).Google Scholar
  • Rouziès D (2004) Observatoire de la relation marketing-commercial. Special Report by the Center for the Study of Sales and Marketing Relationships. White paper, ADETEM, BT-Syntegra, HEC-Paris, Microsoft and Novamétrie.Google Scholar
  • Rouziès D, Anderson E, Kohli AK, Michaels RE, Weitz BA, Zoltners AA (2005) Sales and marketing integration: A proposed framework. J. Personal Selling Sales Management XXV(2): 113–122.Google Scholar
  • Scharfstein DS, Stein JC (2000) The dark side of internal capital markets: Divisional rent-seeking and inefficient investment. J. Finance 55(6):2537–2564.CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Shin D (2008) Information acquisition and optimal project management. Internat. J. Indust. Organ. 26(4):1032–1043.CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Simester D, Zhang J (2010) Why are bad products so hard to kill? Management Sci. 56(7):1161–1179.LinkGoogle Scholar
  • Simonetto M, Montan L, Meehan J, Kaji J (2012) Structuring and managing an effective pricing organization. Özer Ö, Phillips R, eds. Oxford Handbook of Pricing Management (Oxford University Press, Oxford, UK).CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Sodhi MS, Sodhi NS (2007) Six Sigma Pricing: Improving Pricing Operations to Increase Profits (FT Press, Upper Saddle River, NJ).Google Scholar
  • Weinberg CB (1975) An optimal commission plan for salesmen's control over prices. Management Sci. 21(April):937–943.LinkGoogle Scholar
  • Wernerfelt B (1994) On the function of sales assistance. Marketing Sci. 13(1):68–82.LinkGoogle Scholar
  • Wulf J (2009) Influence and inefficiency in the internal capital market. J. Econom. Behav. Organ. 72(1):305–321.CrossrefGoogle Scholar
INFORMS site uses cookies to store information on your computer. Some are essential to make our site work; Others help us improve the user experience. By using this site, you consent to the placement of these cookies. Please read our Privacy Statement to learn more.