To Share or Not to Share: Demand Forecast Sharing in a Distribution Channel

References

• Agency Sales (2003) Who provides the marketing information? 33(1):44–45.Google Scholar
• Aviv Y (2001) The effect of collaborative forecast on supply chain performance. Management Sci. 47(10):1326–1343.Link, Google Scholar
• Cachon G, Fisher M (2000) Supply chain inventory management and the value of shared information. Management Sci. 46(8):1032–1048.Link, Google Scholar
• Cho IK, Kreps D (1987) Signaling games and stable equilibria. Quart. J. Econom. 102(2):179–221.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Chu WJ, Messinger PR (1997) Information and channel profits. J. Retailing 73(4):487–499.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Desai PS (2000) Multiple messages to retain retailers: Signaling new product demand. Marketing Sci. 19(4):381–389.Link, Google Scholar
• Desai PS, Srinivasan K (1995) Demand signaling under unobservable effort in franchising: Linear and non-linear price contracts. Management Sci. 41(10):1608–1623.Link, Google Scholar
• Dukes A, Gal-Or E, Geylani T (2011) Who benefits from bilateral information exchange in a retail channel? Econom. Lett. 112(2): 210–212.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Fisher ML, Hammond JH, Obermeyer WR, Raman A (1994) Making supply meet demand in an uncertain world. Harvard Bus. Rev. 72(3):83–93.Google Scholar
• Gallini NT, Wright BD (1990) Technology transfer under asymmetric information. RAND J. Econom. 21(1):147–160.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Gal-Or E, Geylani T, Dukes A (2008) Information sharing in a channel with partially informed retailers. Marketing Sci. 27(4):642–658.Link, Google Scholar
• Guo L (2009) The benefits of downstream information acquisition. Marketing Sci. 28(3):457–471.Link, Google Scholar
• Guo L, Iyer G (2010) Information acquisition and sharing in a vertical relationship. Marketing Sci. 29(3):483–506.Link, Google Scholar
• Guo X, Jiang B (2016) Signaling through price and quality to consumers with fairness concerns. J. Marketing Res. Forthcoming.Crossref, Google Scholar
• He C, Marklund J, Vossen T (2008) Vertical information sharing in a volatile market. Marketing Sci. 27(3):513–530.Link, Google Scholar
• Iyer G, Villas-Boas M (2003) A bargaining theory of distribution channels. J. Marketing Res. 40(1):80–100.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Iyer G, Narasimhan C, Niraj R (2007) Information and inventory in distribution channels. Management Sci. 53(10):1551–1561.Link, Google Scholar
• Jiang B, Jerath K, Srinivasan K (2011) Firm strategies in the “Mid Tail” of platform-based retailing. Marketing Sci. 30(5):757–775.Link, Google Scholar
• Jiang B, Ni J, Srinivasan K (2014) Signaling through pricing by service providers with social preferences. Marketing Sci. 33(5):641–654.Link, Google Scholar
• Jiang B, Sudhir K, Zou T (2016) Cost-information transparency and intertemporal pricing. SSRN Working Paper, Washington University in St. Louis, St. Louis.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Laucka K (2005) The accuracy trap. SDC (July 5), http://www.sdcexec.com/news/10357301/the-accuracy-trap.Google Scholar
• Lee HL, So KC, Tang CS (2000) The value of information sharing in a two-level supply chain. Management Sci. 46(5):626–643.Link, Google Scholar
• Li L (2002) Information sharing in a supply chain with horizontal competition. Management Sci. 48(9):1196–1212.Link, Google Scholar
• Li L, Zhang H (2008) Confidentiality and information sharing in supply chain coordination. Management Sci. 54(8):1467–1481.Link, Google Scholar
• Mailath GJ, Okuno-Fujiwara M, Postlewaite A (1993) Belief-based refinements in signaling games. J. Econom. Theory 60(2):241–276.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Miyaoka J, Hausman WH (2008) How improved forecasts can degrade decentralized supply chains. Manufacturing Service Oper. Management 10(3):547–562.Link, Google Scholar
• Mohr JJ, Sohi RS (1995) Communication flows in distribution channels: Impact on assessments of communication quality and satisfaction. J. Retailing 71(4):393–416.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Moorthy S, Srinivasan K (1995) Signaling quality with a money-back guarantee: The role of transaction costs. Marketing Sci. 14(4):442–466.Link, Google Scholar
• Shin H, Tunca T (2010) The effect of competition on demand forecast investments and supply chain coordination. Oper. Res. 58(6): 1592–1610.Link, Google Scholar
• Shin J (2005) The role of selling costs in signaling price image. J. Marketing Res. 42(3):302–312.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Simester D (1995) Signalling price image using advertised prices. Marketing Sci. 14(2):166–188.Link, Google Scholar
• Taylor TA, Xiao W (2010) Does a manufacturer benefit from selling to a better-forecasting retailer? Management Sci. 56(9):1584–1598.Link, Google Scholar
• Tirole J (1988) The Theory of Industrial Organization (MIT Press, Cambridge, MA).Google Scholar
• Voluntary Interindustry Commerce Solutions Association (VICSA) (1999) Roadmap to CPFR: The case studies. White paper, Lawrenceville, NJ, http://www.gs1us.org/DesktopModules/Bring2mind/DMX/Download.aspx?entryid=632.Google Scholar