Interorganizational Trust, Governance Choice, and Exchange Performance

References

• Argyres N. S., Liebeskind J. P. Contractual commitments, bargaining power, and governance inseparability: Incorporating history into transaction cost theory. Acad. Management Rev. (1999) 24:49–63Crossref, Google Scholar
• Arrow K.The Limits of Organization (1974) (Norton, New York) Google Scholar
• Aulakh P. S., Kotabe M., Sahay A. Trust and performance in cross-border marketing partnerships: A behavioral approach. J. Internat. Bus. Stud. (1996) 27(5):1005–1032Crossref, Google Scholar
• Barney J. B., Hansen M. H. Trustworthiness as a source of competitive advantage. Strategic Management J. (1994) 15:175–190Crossref, Google Scholar
• Becerra M., Gupta A. K. Perceived trustworthiness within the organization: The moderating impact of communication frequency on trustor and trustee effects. Organ. Sci. (2003) 14(1):32–44Link, Google Scholar
• Bercovitz J., Nickerson J. A., Jap S. The antecedents and performance implications of cooperative exchange norms. Organ. Sci. (2006) 17(6):724–740Link, Google Scholar
• Blau P.Exchange and Power in Social Life (1964) (Wiley, New York) Google Scholar
• Bradach J., Eccles R. Rice, authority, and trust: From ideal types to plural forms. Annual Rev. Sociol. (1989) 15:97–118Crossref, Google Scholar
• Bromiley P., Cummings L. L. Transaction costs in organizations with trust. Res. Negotiation Organ. (1995) 5:219–247Google Scholar
• Carmines E. G., Zeller R. A.Reliability and Validity Assessment (1979) (Sage, Beverly Hills, CA) Crossref, Google Scholar
• Chiles T. H., McMackin J. F. Integrating variable risk preferences, trust, and transaction cost economics. Acad. Management Rev. (1996) 21(1):73–99Crossref, Google Scholar
• Cummings L. L., Bromily P., Kramer R., Tyler T. The organizational trust inventory (OTI): Development and validation. Trust in Organizations (1996) (Sage, Thousand Oaks, CA) Crossref, Google Scholar
• Dirks K. T., Ferrin D. L. The role of trust in organizational settings. Organ. Sci. (2001) 12:450–467Link, Google Scholar
• Dodgson M. Learning, trust, and technological collaboration. Human Relations (1993) 46(1):77–94Crossref, Google Scholar
• Dore R. Goodwill and the spirit of market capitalism. British J. Sociol. (1983) 34:459–482Crossref, Google Scholar
• Dwyer F. R., Schurr P. H., Oh S. Developing buyer-seller relationships. J. Marketing (1987) 51:11–27Crossref, Google Scholar
• Dyer J. H. Effective interfirm collaboration: How firms minimize transaction costs and maximize transaction value. Strategic Management J. (1997) 18(7):535–556Crossref, Google Scholar
• Eccles R. G. Bureaucratic versus craft administration: The relationship of market structure to the construction firm. Admin. Sci. Quart. (1981) 26(3):449–469Crossref, Google Scholar
• Eccles R. G., Crane D. B.Doing Deals: Investment Banks at Work (1988) (Harvard University Press, Boston) Google Scholar
• Eccles R. G., White H. C. Price and authority in inter-profit center transactions. Amer. J. Sociol. (1988) 94:S17–S51Crossref, Google Scholar
• Fehr E., Gachter S. Do incentive contracts crowd out voluntary cooperation? (2000) . Working paper, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics, University of Zurich, SwitzerlandCrossref, Google Scholar
• Fowler F. J.Survey Research Methods (1993) (Sage, Beverly Hills, CA) Google Scholar
• Frey B. S. A constitution for knaves crowds out civic Virtues. Econom. J. (1997) 107:1043–53Google Scholar
• Fukuyama F.Trust: The Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity (1995) (The Free Press, New York) Google Scholar
• Gambetta D., Gambetta D. Can we trust trust? Trust: Making and Breaking Cooperative Relations (1988) 13Electronic edition(Department of Sociology, University of Oxford)213–237Google Scholar
• Ghoshal S., Moran P. Bad for practice: A critique of the transaction cost theory. Acad. Management Rev. (1996) 21(1):13–47Crossref, Google Scholar
• Granovetter M. Economic action and social structure: The problem of embeddedness. Amer. J. Sociol. (1985) 91(Nov.):481–510Crossref, Google Scholar
• Greene W. H.Econometric Analysis (2002) (Prentice-Hall, Upper Saddle River, NJ) Google Scholar
• Gulati R. Does familiarity breed trust? The implications of repeated ties for contractual choice in alliances. Acad. Management J. (1995) 38(1):85–112Crossref, Google Scholar
• Gulati R.Managing Network Resources: Alliances, Affiliations, and Other Relational Assets (2007) (Oxford University Press, New York) Crossref, Google Scholar
• Gulati R., Singh H. The architecture of cooperation: Managing coordination costs and appropriation concerns in strategic alliances. Admin. Sci. Quart. (1998) 43:781–814Crossref, Google Scholar
• Gulati R., Sytch M. Dependence asymmetry and joint dependence in interorganizational relationships: Effects of embeddedness on a manufacturer's performance in procurement relationships. Admin. Sci. Quart. (2007) 52:32–69Crossref, Google Scholar
• Gulati R., Sytch M. Does familiarity breed trust? Revisiting the antecedents of trust. Managerial Decision Econom. (2008) 29:169–190Crossref, Google Scholar
• Gulati R., Lawrence P., Puranam P. Adaptation in vertical relationships: Beyond incentive conflict. Strategic Management J. (2005) 26:415–440Crossref, Google Scholar
• Hamilton B., Nickerson J. Correcting for endogeneity in strategic management research. Strategic Organ. (2003) 1(1):53–80Crossref, Google Scholar
• Heide J. B., John G. Alliances in industrial purchasing: The determinants of joint action in buyer-supplier relationships. J. Marketing Res. (1990) 27(1):24–36Crossref, Google Scholar
• Heide J. B., Miner A. S. The shadow of the future: Effects of anticipated interaction and frequency of contact on buyer-seller cooperation. Acad. Management J. (1992) 35(2):265–291Crossref, Google Scholar
• Hill C. W. L. Cooperation, opportunism, and the invisible hand: Implications for transaction cost theory. Acad. Management Rev. (1990) 15(3):500–513Crossref, Google Scholar
• Idson T. L., Feaster D. J. A selectivity model of employer-size wage differentials. J. Labor Econom. (1990) 8(1):99–122Crossref, Google Scholar
• Jones C., Hesterly W. S., Borgatti S. P. A general theory of network governance: Exchange conditions and social mechanisms. Acad. Management Rev. (1997) 22(4):911–945Crossref, Google Scholar
• Kim J. O., Mueller C. W.Factor Analysis: Statistical Methods and Practical Issues (1978) (Sage, Newbury Park, CA) Crossref, Google Scholar
• Kramer R. Trust and distrust in organizations: Emerging perspectives, enduring questions. Annual Rev. Psych. (1999) 50:569–598Crossref, Google Scholar
• Larson A. Network dyads in entrepreneurial settings: A study of the governance of exchange relationships. Admin. Sci. Quart. (1992) 37:76–104Crossref, Google Scholar
• Lazerson M. Small firm growth: An outcome of markets and hierarchies. Amer. Sociol. Rev. (1988) 53(3):330–342Crossref, Google Scholar
• Lazzarini S. G., Miller G. J., Zenger T. R. Order with some law: Complementarity vs. substitution of formal and informal arrangements. J. Law, Econom. Organ. (2004) 20(2):261–298Crossref, Google Scholar
• Lincoln J. M., Gerlach M. L.Japan's Network Economy (2004) (Cambridge University Press, New York) Crossref, Google Scholar
• Lorenz E. H., Gambetta D. Neither friends nor strangers: Informal networks of subcontracting in French industry. Trust: Making and Breaking Cooperative Relations (1988) (Basil Blackwell Ltd., Cambridge, MA) 194–210Google Scholar
• Lubell M., Scholz J. T. Cooperation, reciprocity, and the collective-action heuristic. Amer. J. Political Sci. (2001) 45(1):160–178Crossref, Google Scholar
• Luhmann N.Trust and Power (1979) (Wiley, New York) Google Scholar
• Macaulay S. Non-contractual relations and business: A preliminary study. Amer. Sociol. Rev. (1963) 28(1):55–70Crossref, Google Scholar
• MacNeil I. R. Power, contract, and the economic model. J. Econom. Issues (1980) 14(4):909–923Crossref, Google Scholar
• MacNeil I. R. Values in contract: Internal and external. Northwestern Univ. Law Rev. (1983) 78:340–418Google Scholar
• Maddala G. S.Limited-Dependent and Qualitative Variables in Econometrics (1983) (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK) Crossref, Google Scholar
• Malhotra D., Murnighan J. K. The effects contracts on interpersonal trust. Admin. Sci. Quart. (2002) 47(3/4):534–559Crossref, Google Scholar
• Mariotti S., Cainarca G. C. The evolution of transaction governance in the textile-clothing industry. J. Econom. Behav. Organ. (1986) 7(4):351–374Crossref, Google Scholar
• Masten S. E., Meehan J., Snyder E. Vertical integration in the U.S. auto industry: A note on the influence of transaction specific assets. J. Econom. Behav. Organ. (1989) 12:265–273Crossref, Google Scholar
• Masten S., Meehan J., Snyder E. The costs of organization. J. Law, Econom. Organ. (1991) 7:1–25Crossref, Google Scholar
• Mayer K. J. Buyer-supplier relationships in high technology industries. (1999) . Ph.D. dissertation, University of California at Berkeley, BerkeleyGoogle Scholar
• Mayer K. J., Nickerson J. A. Antecedents and performance implications of contracting for knowledge workers: Evidence from information technology services. Organ. Sci. (2005) 1(3):225–242Link, Google Scholar
• Monteverde K., Teece D. J. Supplier switching costs and vertical integration in the automobile industry. Bell J. Econom. (1982) 13:206–213Crossref, Google Scholar
• Nooteboom B. Trust, opportunism and governance: A process and control model. Organ. Stud. (1996) 17:985–1010Crossref, Google Scholar
• Nooteboom B., Berger H., Noorderhaven N. Effects of trust and governance on relational risk. Acad. Management J. (1997) 40(2):308–338Crossref, Google Scholar
• North D. C.Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance (1990) (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK) Crossref, Google Scholar
• Nunnally J. C.Psychometric Theory (1978) (McGraw-Hill, New York) Google Scholar
• Parkhe A. Strategic alliance structuring: A game theoretic and transaction cost examination of interfirm cooperation. Acad. Management J. (1993) 36:794–829Crossref, Google Scholar
• Perrow C.Complex Organizations: A Critical Essay (1986) 3rd ed.(Random House, New York) Google Scholar
• Poppo L., Zenger T. R. Do formal contracts and relational governance function as substitutes or complements? Strategic Management J. (2002) 23(8):707–725Crossref, Google Scholar
• Ring P. S., Van de Ven A. H. Developmental processes of cooperative interorganizational relationships. Acad. Management Rev. (1994) 19(1):90–118Crossref, Google Scholar
• Rotemberg J. J., Saloner G. Overt interfunctional conflict (and its reduction through business strategy). RAND J. Econom. (1995) 26:630–653Crossref, Google Scholar
• Rousseau D. M., Sitkin S. B., Burt R. S., Camerer C. Not so different after all: A cross-discipline view of trust. Acad. Management Rev. (1998) 23:393–404Crossref, Google Scholar
• Shelanski H. A., Klein P. G. Empirical research in transaction cost economics: A review and assessment. J. Law, Econom. Organ. (1995) 11(2):335–361Google Scholar
• Siegel S., Castellan N. J.Nonparametric Statistics for the Behavioral Sciences (1988) (McGraw-Hill, New York) Google Scholar
• Sitkin S. B., Roth N. L. Explaining the limited effectiveness of legalistic “remedies” for trust/distrust. Organ. Sci. (1993) 4(3):367–394Link, Google Scholar
• Tenbrunsel A. E., Messick D. M. Sanctioning systems, decision frames, and cooperation. Admin. Sci. Quart. (1999) 44:684–707Crossref, Google Scholar
• Venkatraman N., Grant J. H. Construct measurement in organizational strategy research: A critique and proposal. Acad. Management Rev. (1986) 11(1):71–87Crossref, Google Scholar
• Walker G., Poppo L. Profit centers, single-source suppliers, and transaction costs. Admin. Sci. Quart. (1991) 36:66–87Crossref, Google Scholar
• Walker G., Weber D. Supplier competition, uncertainty, and make-or-buy decisions. Acad. Management J. (1987) 30(3):589–596Crossref, Google Scholar
• Weiss L. The Italian state and small business. Eur. J. Sociol. (1984) 25(2):214–241Crossref, Google Scholar
• Williamson O. E.The Economic Institutions of Capitalism: Firms, Markets, Relational Contracting (1985) (The Free Press, New York) Google Scholar
• Williamson O. E. Comparative economic organization: The analysis of discrete structural alternatives. Admin. Sci. Quart. (1991) 36:269–296Crossref, Google Scholar
• Williamson O. E. Calculativeness, trust and economic organization. J. Law Econom. (1993) 36(April):453–486Crossref, Google Scholar
• Williamson O. E.The Mechanisms of Governance (1996) (Oxford University Press, New York) Crossref, Google Scholar
• Zaheer A., Venkatraman N. Relational governance as an interorganizational strategy: An empirical test of the role of trust in economic exchange. Strategic Management J. (1995) 16:373–392Crossref, Google Scholar
• Zaheer A., McEvily B., Perrone V. Does trust matter? Exploring the effects of interorganizational and interpersonal trust on performance. Organ. Sci. (1998) 9:141–159Link, Google Scholar
• Zeller R. A., Carmines E. G.Measurement in the Social Sciences: The Link Between Theory and Data (1980) (Cambridge University Press, New York) Google Scholar
• Zucker L. G. Institutional theories of organization. Annual Rev. Sociol. (1987) 13:443–464Crossref, Google Scholar
• Zukin S., DiMaggio P.Structures of Capital: The Social Organisation of the Economy (1990) (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK) Google Scholar