Unraveling the Impact of Distributed Government Authority: Evidence from OSHA Oversight of Defense Contractors

References

• Akerlof GA (1978) The market for “lemons”: Quality uncertainty and the market mechanism. Diamond P, Rothschild M, eds. Uncertainty in Economics (Elsevier, Amsterdam), 235–251.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Alexander R, Mazza SW, Scholz S (2009) Measuring rates of return on lobbying expenditures: An empirical case study of tax breaks for multinational corporations. J. Law & Politics 25(4):401–457.Google Scholar
• Alix-Garcia JM, Sims KR, Phaneuf DJ (2019) Using referenda to improve targeting and decrease costs of conditional cash transfers. J. Public Econom. 176:179–194.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Alizamir S, Iravani F, Mamani H (2019) An analysis of price vs. revenue protection: Government subsidies in the agriculture industry. Management Sci. 65(1):32–49.Link, Google Scholar
• Allison PD (1999) Multiple Regression: A Primer (Pine Forge Press, Thousand Oaks, CA).Google Scholar
• Allison PD, Waterman RP (2002) Fixed-effects negative binomial regression models. Sociol. Methodology 32(1):247–265.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Anand J, Mulotte L, Ren CR (2016) Does experience imply learning? Strategic Management J. 37(7):1395–1412.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Armstrong M, Sappington DE (2007) Recent developments in the theory of regulation. Handbook Industrial Organ. 3:1557–1700.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Arrow KJ (1962) The economic implications of learning by doing. Rev. Econom. Stud. 29(3):155–173.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Bajari P, Tadelis S (2001) Incentives versus transaction costs: A theory of procurement contracts. RAND J. Econom. 387–407.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Barber B IV, Diestre L (2019) Pushing for speed or scope? Pharmaceutical lobbying and Food and Drug Administration drug review. Strategic Management J. 40(8):1194–1218.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Baron DP, Besanko D (1988) Monitoring of performance in organizational contracting: The case of defense procurement. Scandinavian J. Econom. 329–356.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Baumgartner FR, Jones BD (2002) Policy Dynamics (University of Chicago Press).Google Scholar
• Baumgartner FR, Jones BD (2010) Agendas and Instability in American Politics (University of Chicago Press).Google Scholar
• Bergh DD, Ketchen DJ Jr, Orlandi I, Heugens PP, Boyd BK (2019) Information asymmetry in management research: Past accomplishments and future opportunities. J. Management 45(1):122–158.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Berrios R (2006) Government contracts and contractor behavior. J. Bus. Ethics 63:119–130.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Besley T, Burgess R (2001) Political agency, government responsiveness and the role of the media. Eur. Econom. Rev. 45(4–6):629–640.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Bonardi J-P, Keim GD (2005) Corporate political strategies for widely salient issues. Acad. Management Rev. 30(3):555–576.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Bonardi J-P, Hillman AJ, Keim GD (2005) The attractiveness of political markets: Implications for firm strategy. Acad. Management Rev. 30(2):397–413.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Bonardi J-P, Holburn GL, Vanden Bergh RG (2006) Nonmarket strategy performance: Evidence from US electric utilities. Acad. Management J. 49(6):1209–1228.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Bond P, Goldstein I (2015) Government intervention and information aggregation by prices. J. Finance 70(6):2777–2812.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Brainard WC, Tobin J (1968) Pitfalls in financial model building. Amer. Econom. Rev. 58(2):99–122.Google Scholar
• Brosig‐Koch J, Heinrich T (2014) Reputation and mechanism choice in procurement auctions: An experiment. Production Oper. Management 23(2):210–220.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Brown TL, Potoski M, Van Slyke DM (2006) Managing public service contracts: Aligning values, institutions, and markets. Public Admin. Rev. 66(3):323–331.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Busenbark JR, Graffin SD, Campbell RJ, Lee EY (2022a) A marginal effects approach to interpreting main effects and moderation. Organ. Res. Methods 25(1):147–169.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Busenbark JR, Yoon H, Gamache DL, Withers MC (2022b) Omitted variable bias: Examining management research with the impact threshold of a confounding variable (ITCV). J. Management 48(1):17–48.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Campbell RJ, Busenbark JR, Graffin SD, Boivie S (2021) Retaining problems or solutions? The post‐acquisition performance implications of director retention. Strategic Management J. 42(9):1716–1733.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Carpenter DP (2002) Groups, the media, agency waiting costs, and FDA drug approval. Amer. J. Political Sci. 490–505.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Carril R, Duggan M (2020) The impact of industry consolidation on government procurement: Evidence from Department of Defense contracting. J. Public Econom. 184:104141.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Certo ST, Busenbark JR, Woo H, Semadeni M (2016) Sample selection bias and Heckman models in strategic management research. Strategic Management J. 37(13):2639–2657.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Choi S-J, Jia N, Lu J (2015) The structure of political institutions and effectiveness of corporate political lobbying. Organ. Sci. 26(1):158–179.Link, Google Scholar
• Cohen J, Cohen P, West SG, Aiken LS (2013) Applied Multiple Regression/Correlation Analysis for the Behavioral Sciences (Routledge).Crossref, Google Scholar
• Connelly BL, DesJardine MR, Shi W, Sun Z (2024) Corporate social responsibility in the age of activist directorships. Strategic Management J.Google Scholar
• Cousins P, Dutordoir M, Lawson B, Neto JQF (2020) Shareholder wealth effects of modern slavery regulation. Management Sci. 66(11):5265–5289.Link, Google Scholar
• Crocker KJ, Reynolds KJ (1993) The efficiency of incomplete contracts: An empirical analysis of air force engine procurement. RAND J. Econom. 126–146.Crossref, Google Scholar
• CRS (2018) Defense acquisitions: How and where DOD spends its contracting dollars. CRS Report R44010, Congressional Research Service, Washington, DC.Google Scholar
• Decancq K, Lugo MA (2013) Weights in multidimensional indices of wellbeing: An overview. Econom. Rev. 32(1):7–34.Crossref, Google Scholar
• DeJoy DM (2005) Behavior change versus culture change: Divergent approaches to managing workplace safety. Safety Sci. 43(2):105–129.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Dellarocas C (2005) Reputation mechanism design in online trading environments with pure moral hazard. Inform. Systems Res. 16(2):209–230.Link, Google Scholar
• Edwards J (2024) Pentagon issues FY23 defense spending by state report. GovConWire (October 16), https://www.govconwire.com/articles/dod-fiscal-2023-defense-spending-by-state.Google Scholar
• Eisenhardt KM (1989) Agency theory: An assessment and review. Acad. Management Rev. 14(1):57–74.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Faccio M, Masulis RW, McConnell JJ (2006) Political connections and corporate bailouts. J. Finance 61(6):2597–2635.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Federal Acquisition Regulation (2024) FAR 9.104–Standards (U.S. General Services Administration, Washington, DC).Google Scholar
• Fiorino N, Galli E, Rizzo I, Valente M (2023) Public procurement and reputation. An agent‐based model. Metroeconomica 74(4):806–832.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Flammer C (2018) Competing for government procurement contracts: The role of corporate social responsibility. Strategic Management J. 39(5):1299–1324.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Frank KA (2000) Impact of a confounding variable on a regression coefficient. Sociol. Methods Res. 29(2):147–194.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Fugger N, Katok E, Wambach A (2019) Trust in procurement interactions. Management Sci. 65(11):5110–5127.Link, Google Scholar
• Funk RJ, Hirschman D (2017) Beyond nonmarket strategy: Market actions as corporate political activity. Acad. Management Rev. 42(1):32–52.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Geng Z, Pan J (2024) The SOE premium and government support in China’s credit market. J. Finance 79(5):3041–3103.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Goldman E, Rocholl J, So J (2013) Politically connected boards of directors and the allocation of procurement contracts. Rev. Finance 17(5):1617–1648.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Gordon CM (1994) Choosing appropriate construction contracting method. J. Construction Engrg. Management 120(1):196–210.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Grandy JB, Hiatt SR (2020) State agency discretion and entrepreneurship in regulated markets. Admin. Sci. Quart. 65(4):1092–1131.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Gray WB (1987) The cost of regulation: OSHA, EPA and the productivity slowdown. Amer. Econom. Rev. 77(5):998–1006.Google Scholar
• Guldenmund FW (2000) The nature of safety culture: A review of theory and research. Safety Sci. 34(1–3):215–257.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Hadani M, Schuler DA (2013) In search of El Dorado: The elusive financial returns on corporate political investments. Strategic Management J. 34(2):165–181.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Hadani M, Bonardi J-P, Dahan NM (2017) Corporate political activity, public policy uncertainty, and firm outcomes: A meta-analysis. Strategic Organ. 15(3):338–366.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Hainmueller J (2012) Entropy balancing for causal effects: A multivariate reweighting method to produce balanced samples in observational studies. Political Anal. (Oxford) 20(1):25–46.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Haughwout AF (2002) Public infrastructure investments, productivity and welfare in fixed geographic areas. J. Public Econom. 83(3):405–428.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Hiatt SR, Park S (2013) Lords of the harvest: Third-party influence and regulatory approval of genetically modified organisms. Acad. Management J. 56(4):923–944.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Hill AD, Johnson SG, Greco LM, O’Boyle EH, Walter SL (2021) Endogeneity: A review and agenda for the methodology-practice divide affecting micro and macro research. J. Management 47(1):105–143.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Hillman AJ, Hitt MA (1999) Corporate political strategy formulation: A model of approach, participation, and strategy decisions. Acad. Management Rev. 24(4):825–842.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Hillman A, Keim G (1995) International variation in the business-government interface: Institutional and organizational considerations. Acad. Management Rev. 20(1):193–214.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Holburn GL, Vanden Bergh RG (2008) Making friends in hostile environments: Political strategy in regulated industries. Acad. Management Rev. 33(2):521–540.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Holburn GL, Vanden Bergh RG (2014) Integrated market and nonmarket strategies: Political campaign contributions around merger and acquisition events in the energy sector. Strategic Management J. 35(3):450–460.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Huneeus F, Kim IS (2018) The effects of firms’ lobbying on resource misallocation. MIT Political Science Department Research Paper No. 2018-23, Cambridge, MA.Google Scholar
• Jackson RJ Jr, Rosenberg D (2006) A new method of random sampling to reduce the cost of regulatory monitoring. Law and Economics Discussion Paper No. 562, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA.Google Scholar
• Jacobs S, Schillemans T (2016) Media and public accountability: Typology and exploration. Policy Politics 44(1):23–40.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Johnston JM, Girth AM (2012) Government contracts and “managing the market” exploring the costs of strategic management responses to weak vendor competition. Admin. Soc. 44(1):3–29.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Jones BD, Baumgartner FR (2012) From there to here: Punctuated equilibrium to the general punctuation thesis to a theory of government information processing. Policy Stud. J. 40(1):1–20.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Joskow P (1996) Contract duration and relation-specific investments: Emprical evidence from coal markets. Case Stud. Contracting Organ. 104–129.Google Scholar
• Katic IV, Hillman A (2023) Corporate political activity, reimagined: Revisiting the political marketplace. J. Management 49(6):1911–1938.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Kim IS (2018) Lobbyview: Firm-level lobbying & congressional bills database. Accessed January 14, 2024, http://web.mit.edu/insong/www/pdf/lobbyview.pdf.Google Scholar
• Kim JH (2019) Is your playing field unleveled? US defense contracts and foreign firm lobbying. Strategic Management J. 40(12):1911–1937.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Kim H, Kim H, Lee PM (2008) Ownership structure and the relationship between financial slack and R&D investments: Evidence from Korean firms. Organ. Sci. 19(3):404–418.Link, Google Scholar
• King AA, Lenox MJ (2000) Industry self-regulation without sanctions: The chemical industry’s responsible care program. Acad. Management J. 43(4):698–716.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Kölbel JF, Busch T, Jancso LM (2017) How media coverage of corporate social irresponsibility increases financial risk. Strategic Management J. 38(11):2266–2284.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Krautmann AC, Oppenheimer M (2002) Contract length and the return to performance in major league baseball. J. Sports Econom. 3(1):6–17.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Lee L-F (1982) Some approaches to the correction of selectivity bias. Rev. Econom. Stud. 49(3):355–372.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Lee M-J (2005) Micro-Econometrics for Policy, Program and Treatment Effects (OUP Oxford).Crossref, Google Scholar
• Leiblein MJ, Reuer JJ, Dalsace F (2002) Do make or buy decisions matter? The influence of organizational governance on technological performance. Strategic Management J. 23(9):817–833.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Lewbel A (2012) Using heteroscedasticity to identify and estimate mismeasured and endogenous regressor models. J. Bus. Econom. Statist. 30(1):67–80.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Lewbel A (2018) Identification and estimation using heteroscedasticity without instruments: The binary endogenous regressor case. Econ. Lett. 165:10–12.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Li J, Wu D (2020) Do corporate social responsibility engagements lead to real environmental, social, and governance impact? Management Sci. 66(6):2564–2588.Link, Google Scholar
• Li B, Huang N, Shi W (2025) Forced to change? Media exposure of labor issues and firm artificial intelligence investment. Inform. Systems Res. 37(1):156–175.Google Scholar
• Lux S, Crook TR, Woehr DJ (2011) Mixing business with politics: A meta-analysis of the antecedents and outcomes of corporate political activity. J. Management 37(1):223–247.Google Scholar
• Macher JT, Mayo JW, Nickerson JA (2011) Regulator heterogeneity and endogenous efforts to close the information asymmetry gap: Evidence from FDA regulation. J. Law Econom. 54(1):25–54.Google Scholar
• Maxwell JW, Lyon TP, Hackett SC (2000) Self-regulation and social welfare: The political economy of corporate environmentalism. J. Law Econom. 43(2):583–618.Crossref, Google Scholar
• McDonnell M-H, Werner T (2016) Blacklisted businesses: Social activists’ challenges and the disruption of corporate political activity. Admin. Sci. Quart. 61(4):584–620.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Mui R, Abdurakhmonov M, Hill AD, Ridge J (2024) Putting the politics into corporate political activity: A variance decomposition analysis of firm–government interactions across political contexts. J. Management.Google Scholar
• Nadkarni S, Herrmann P, Perez PD (2011) Domestic mindsets and early international performance: The moderating effect of global industry conditions. Strategic Management J. 32(5):510–531.Crossref, Google Scholar
• O’Brien JP, David P (2014) Reciprocity and R&D search: Applying the behavioral theory of the firm to a communitarian context. Strategic Management J. 35(4):550–565.Crossref, Google Scholar
• OSHA.gov (2002) Occupational injury and illness recording and reporting requirements. https://www.osha.gov/laws-regs/federalregister/2001-01-19.Google Scholar
• Palmrose Z-V (1989) The relation of audit contract type to audit fees and hours. Accounting Rev. 488–499.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Pfeffer J, Salancik G (1978) The External Control of Organizations: A Resource-Dependence Perspective (Harper & Row, New York).Google Scholar
• Polinsky AM, Shavell S (1992) Enforcement costs and the optimal magnitude and probability of fines. J. Law Econom. 35(1):133–148.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Richter BK, Samphantharak K, Timmons JF (2009) Lobbying and taxes. Amer. J. Political Sci. 53(4):893–909.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Ridge JW, Ingram A, Hill AD (2017) Beyond lobbying expenditures: How lobbying breadth and political connectedness affect firm outcomes. Acad. Management J. 60(3):1138–1163.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Rogerson WP (2003) Simple menus of contracts in cost-based procurement and regulation. Amer. Econom. Rev. 93(3):919–926.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Sadeh A, Dvir D, Shenhar A (2000) The role of contract type in the success of R&D defense projects under increasing uncertainty. Project Management J. 31(3):14–22.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Samuels D (2021) Government procurement and changes in firm transparency. Accounting Rev. 96(1):401–430.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Scholz JT, Wei FH (1986) Regulatory enforcement in a federalist system. Amer. Political Sci. Rev. 80(4):1249–1270.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Semadeni M, Withers MC, Trevis Certo S (2014) The perils of endogeneity and instrumental variables in strategy research: Understanding through simulations. Strategic Management J. 35(7):1070–1079.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Shi W, Zhang Y, Hoskisson RE (2017) Ripple effects of CEO awards: Investigating the acquisition activities of superstar CEOs’ competitors. Strategic Management J. 38(10):2080–2102.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Shipan CR (2004) Regulatory regimes, agency actions, and the conditional nature of congressional influence. Amer. Political Sci. Rev. 98(3):467–480.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Short JL, Toffel MW (2010) Making self-regulation more than merely symbolic: The critical role of the legal environment. Admin. Sci. Quart. 55(3):361–396.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Spagnolo G (2012) Reputation, competition, and entry in procurement. Internat. J. Industrial Organ. 30(3):291–296.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Spence M (2002) Signaling in retrospect and the informational structure of markets. Amer. Econom. Rev. 92(3):434–459.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Stigler GJ (1971) The theory of economic regulation. Bell J. Econom. Management.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Stock J, Yogo M (2005) Asymptotic distributions of instrumental variables statistics with many instruments. Andrews DWK, Stock JH, eds. Identification and Inference for Econometric Models: Essays in Honor of Thomas Rothenberg, vol. 6 (Cambridge University Press, New York), 109–120.Google Scholar
• Tadelis S (2002) Complexity, flexibility, and the make-or-buy decision. Amer. Econom. Rev. 92(2):433–437.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Tadelis S (2012) Public procurement design: Lessons from the private sector. Internat. J. Industrial Organ. 30(3):297–302.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Terza JV, Basu A, Rathouz PJ (2008) Two-stage residual inclusion estimation: Addressing endogeneity in health econometric modeling. J. Health Econom. 27(3):531–543.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Thorne J, Holmes SA, McGowan AS, Strand CA, Strawser RH (2001) The relation between audit pricing and audit contract type: A public sector analysis. J. Accounting Public Policy 20(3):189–215.Crossref, Google Scholar
• U.S. Department of Labor (2016) Field Operations Manual (U.S. Department of Labor, Washington, DC).Google Scholar
• U.S. Government Accountability Office (2019) Defense contracting: Enhanced information needed on contractor workplace safety. GAO-19-235, U.S. Government Accountability Office, Washington, DC. Google Scholar
• U.S. Government Accountability Office (2020) Defense contractors: Information on violations of safety, health, and fair labor standards. GAO-20-587R, U.S. Government Accountability Office, Washington, DC.Google Scholar
• Van Loo R (2019) Regulatory monitors. Columbia Law Rev. 119(2):369–444.Google Scholar
• Wadhwa A, Bodas Freitas IM, Sarkar M (2017) The paradox of openness and value protection strategies: Effect of extramural R&D on innovative performance. Organ. Sci. 28(5):873–893.Link, Google Scholar
• Waldron RJ, Altemose JR (1979) Determining and defending personnel needs in criminal justice organizations. Public Admin. Rev. 39(4):385–389.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Walker MJ, Katok E, Shachat J (2023) Trust and trustworthiness in procurement contracts with retainage. Management Sci. 69(6):3492–3515.Link, Google Scholar
• Wang C, San Miguel JG (2013) Are cost-plus defense contracts (justifiably) out of favor? J. Governmental Nonprofit Accounting 2(1):1–15.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Wei Y, Jia N, Bonardi J-P (2023) Corporate political connections: A multidisciplinary review. J. Management 49(6):1870–1910.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Weil D (1996) If OSHA is so bad, why is compliance so good? RAND J. Econom. 618–640.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Weil D (2010) Improving workplace conditions through strategic enforcement. Research Paper No. 2010-20, Boston University School of Management, Boston, MA.Google Scholar
• Wiengarten F, Fan D, Lo CK, Pagell M (2017) The differing impacts of operational and financial slack on occupational safety in varying market conditions. J. Oper. Management 52:30–45.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Williamson OE (1975) Markets and hierarchies: Analysis and antitrust implications: A study in the economics of internal organization. University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign’s Academy for Entrepreneurial Leadership Historical Research Reference in EntrepreneurshipGoogle Scholar
• Williamson OE (1979) Transaction-cost economics: The governance of contractual relations. J. Law Econom. 22(2):233–261.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Williamson OE (1989) Transaction cost economics. Handbook Industrial Organ. 1:135–182.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Witko C (2011) Campaign contributions, access, and government contracting. J. Public Administration Res. Theory 21(4):761–778.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Yan JZ, Chang SJ (2018) The contingent effects of political strategies on firm performance: A political network perspective. Strategic Management J. 39(8):2152–2177.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Yue LQ, Wang J (2024) Policy learning in nascent industries’ venue shifting: A study of the US small unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) industry. Bus. Soc. 63(5):1203–1251.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Zhang J, Shi W, Connelly BL (2024) Screening theory and its boundaries: Investigation of screen credibility, necessity, and salience in the context of corporate venture capital. Acad. Management J. 67(5):1359–1391.Crossref, Google Scholar