Repeated Interactions and Contractual Detail: Identifying the Learning Effect

Published Online:https://doi.org/10.1287/orsc.1080.0402

References

  • Akerlof G. A. Market for lemons—Quality uncertainty and market mechanism. Quart. J. Econom. (1970) 84(3):488–500CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Anand B. N., Khanna T. Do firms learn to create value: The case of alliances. Strategic Management J. (2000) 21(3):295–315CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Anderson E., Weitz B. Determinants of continuity in conventional industrial channel dyads. Marketing Sci. (1989) 8(4):310–323LinkGoogle Scholar
  • Argote L.Organizational Learning: Creating, Retaining, and Transferring Knowledge (1999) (Kluwer Academic Publishers, Boston) Google Scholar
  • Argyres N. S., Mayer K. J. Contract design as a firm capability: An integration of learning and transaction cost perspectives. Acad. Management Rev. (2007) 32(4):1060–1077CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Argyres N. S., Bercovitz J., Mayer K. J. Complementarity and evolution of contractual provisions: An empirical study of IT services contracts. Organ. Sci. (2007) 18(1):3–19LinkGoogle Scholar
  • Artz K. W., Brush T. H. Asset specificity, uncertainty and relational norms: An examination of coordination costs in collaborative strategic alliances. J. Econom. Behav. Organ. (2000) 41(4):337–362CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Atiyah P. S.An Introduction to the Law of Contract (1989) (Clarendon Press, Oxford) Google Scholar
  • Axelrod R.The Evolution of Cooperation (1984) (Basic Books, New York) Google Scholar
  • Batenburg R. S. The external management of automation 1995: Codebook of MAT95. (1997a) . ISCORE Paper 58, Utrecht University, Utrecht, The NetherlandsGoogle Scholar
  • Batenburg R. S. The external management of automation 1995: Fieldwork, response, and non-response. (1997b) . ISCORE Paper 59, Utrecht University, Utrecht, The NetherlandsGoogle Scholar
  • Batenburg R. S., Raub W. The external management of automation 1995. (1995) . ISCORE datafile, Utrecht University, Utrecht, The NetherlandsGoogle Scholar
  • Batenburg R. S., Raub W., Snijders C., Buskens V., Raub W., Snijders C. Contacts and contracts: Dyadic embeddedness and the contractual behavior of firms. The Governance of Relations in Markets and Organizations, Research in the Sociology of Organizations (2003) 20(JAI/Elsevier, Oxford) 135–188CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Ben-Shahar O., White J. J. Boilerplate and economic power in auto manufacturing contracts. Michigan Law Rev. (2006) 104(5):953–982Google Scholar
  • Boynton A. C., Zmud R. W., Jacobs G. C. The influence of IT management practice on IT use in large corporations. MIS Quart. (1994) 18(3):299–318CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Bradach J. L., Eccles R. G. Price, authority, and trust—From ideal types to plural forms. Ann. Rev. Sociol. (1989) 15:97–118CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Buskens V.Social Networks and Trust (2002) (Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht) Google Scholar
  • Camerer C., Knez M. Coordination, organizational boundaries and fads in business practices. Indust. Corporate Change (1996) 5(1):89–112CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Cohen W. M., Levinthal D. A. Absorptive capacity: A new perspective on learning and innovation. Admin. Sci. Quart. (1990) 35(1):128–152CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Corts K. S., Singh J. The effect of repeated interaction on contract choice: Evidence from offshore drilling. J. Law, Econom. Organ. (2004) 20(1):230–260CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Crocker K. J., Reynolds K. J. The efficiency of incomplete contracts: An empirical analysis of air force engine procurement. RAND J. Econom. (1993) 24(1):126–146CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Doz Y. L. The evolution of cooperation in strategic alliances: Initial conditions or learning processes? Strategic Management J. (1996) 17(7):55–83Google Scholar
  • Dutton J. M., Thomas A. Treating progress functions as a managerial opportunity. Acad. Management Rev. (1984) 9(2):235CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Dyer J. H. Specialized supplier networks as a source of competitive advantage: Evidence from the auto industry. Strategic Management J. (1996) 17(4):271–291CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Eisenhardt K. M. Agency theory: An assessment and review. Acad. Management Rev. (1989) 14(1):57–74CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Ellis H. C.The Transfer of Learning (1965) (MacMillan, New York) Google Scholar
  • Granovetter M. Economic action and social structure: The problem of embeddedness. Amer. J. Sociol. (1985) 91(3):481–510CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Grossman S. J., Hart O. D. The costs and benefits of ownership: A theory of vertical and lateral integration. J. Political Econom. (1986) 94(4):691–719CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Gulati R. Does familiarity breed trust? The implications of repeated ties for contractual choice in alliances. Acad. Management J. (1995) 38(1):85–112CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Gulati R., Singh H. The architecture of cooperation: Managing coordination costs and appropriation concerns in strategic alliances. Admin. Sci. Quart. (1998) 43(4):781–814CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Gulati R., Lawrence P. R., Puranam P. Adaptation in vertical relationships: Beyond incentive conflict. Strategic Management J. (2005) 26(5):415–440CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Hamel G. Competition for competence and inter-partner learning within international strategic alliances. Strategic Management J. (1991) 12(4):83–103CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Harman H. H.Modern Factor Analysis (1967) (University of Chicago Press, Chicago) Google Scholar
  • Hart O., Moore J. Property rights and the nature of the firm. J. Political Econom. (1990) 98(6):1119–1158CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Heath C., Staudenmayer N., Staw B. M., Sutton R. L. Coordination neglect: How lay theories of organizing complicate coordination in organizations. Research in Organizational Behavior (2000) 22(JAI Press, New York) 153–191CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Hennart J. F. Explaining the swollen middle—Why most transactions are a mix of market and hierarchy. Organ. Sci. (1993) 4(4):529–547LinkGoogle Scholar
  • Kale P., Dyer J. H., Singh H. Alliance capability, stock market response, and long term alliance success: The role of the alliance function. Strategic Management J. (2002) 23(8):747–767CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Kale P., Singh H., Perlmutter H. Learning and protection of proprietary assets in strategic alliances: Building relational capital. Strategic Management J. (2000) 21(3):217–237CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Kalnins A., Mayer K. J. Relationships and hybrid contracts: An analysis of contract choice in information technology. J. Law, Econom. Organ. (2004) 20(1):207–229CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Klein B., Crawford R. G., Alchian A. A. Vertical integration, appropriable rents, and the competitive contracting process. J. Law Econom. (1978) 21(2):297–326CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Kramer R. M. Trust and distrust in organizations: Emerging perspectives, enduring questions. Ann. Rev. Psych. (1999) 50(1):569–598CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Kumar N., Stern L. W., Anderson J. C. Conducting interorganizational research using key informants. Acad. Management J. (1993) 36(6):1633–1651CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Lacity M. C., Willcocks L. P., Feeny D. F. IT outsourcing: Maximize flexibility and control. Harvard Bus. Rev. (1995) 73(3):84–93Google Scholar
  • Lattin J. M., Carrol J. D., Green P. E.Analyzing Multivariate Data (2003) (Thomson Learning, Pacific Grove, CA) Google Scholar
  • Llewellyn K. What price contract? An essay in perspective. Yale Law J. (1931) 40(5):704–751CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Luo Y. Contract, cooperation, and performance in international joint ventures. Strategic Management J. (2002) 23(10):903–919CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Macaulay S. Non-contractual relations in business: A preliminary study. Amer. Sociol. Rev. (1963) 28(1):55–67CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Macneil I. R. Contracts: Adjustment of long-term economic relations under classical, neoclassical and relational contract law. Northwestern Univ. Law Rev. (1978) 72:854–905Google Scholar
  • Mayer K. J. Spillovers and governance: An analysis of knowledge and reputational spillovers in information technology. Acad. Management J. (2006) 49(1):69–84CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Mayer K. J., Argyres N. S. Learning to contract: Evidence from the personal computer industry. Organ. Sci. (2004) 15(4):394–410LinkGoogle Scholar
  • Parkhe A. Strategic alliance structuring: A game theoretic and transaction cost examination of interfirm. Acad. Management J. (1993) 36(4):794–829CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Podsakoff P. M., Organ D. W. Self-reports in organizational research—Problems and prospects. J. Management (1986) 12(4):531–544CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Podsakoff P. M., MacKenzie S. B., Lee J.-Y., Podsakoff N. P. Common method biases in behavioral research: A critical review of the literature and recommended remedies. J. Appl. Psych. (2003) 88(5):879–903CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Poppo L., Zenger T. Do formal contracts and relational governance function as substitutes or complements? Strategic Management J. (2002) 23(8):707–725CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Powell W. W. Hybrid organizational arrangements—New form or transitional development. Calif. Management Rev. (1987) 30(1):67–87CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Puranam P., Vanneste B. S. Trust and governance: Untangling a tangled web. Acad. Management Rev. (2009) 34(1CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Ring P. S., Van de Ven A. H. Structuring cooperative relationships between organizations. Strategic Management J. (1992) 13(7):483–498CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Rooks G.Contract en Conflict: Strategisch Management van Inkooptransacties (in Dutch) (2002) (Thela Thesis, Amsterdam, The Netherlands) Google Scholar
  • Rooks G., Batenburg R. S., Raub W. The external management of automation 1998. (1998) . ISCORE datafile, Utrecht University, Utrecht, The NetherlandsGoogle Scholar
  • Ryall M. D., Sampson R. C. Formal contracts in the presence of relational enforcement mechanisms: Evidence from technology development projects. Management Sci. (2009) 55(6):906–925LinkGoogle Scholar
  • Saussier S. Transaction costs and contractual incompleteness: The case of Electricite de France. J. Econom. Behav. Organ. (2000) 42(2):189–206CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Simon H. A.Models of Man (1957) (Wiley, New York) Google Scholar
  • Skowronski J. J., Carlston D. E. Caught in the act: When impressions based on highly diagnostic behaviours are resistant to contradiction. Eur. J. Soc. Psych. (1992) 22(5):435–452CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Stinchcombe A. L.Constructing Social Theories (1987) (University of Chicago Press, Chicago) Google Scholar
  • Stinchcombe A. L.Information and Organizations (1990) (University of California Press, Berkeley, CA) CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Whang S. Contracting for software development. Management Sci. (1992) 38(3):307–324LinkGoogle Scholar
  • Williamson O. E.Markets and Hierarchies—Analysis and Antitrust Implications (1975) (The Free Press, New York) Google Scholar
  • Williamson O. E.The Economic Institutions of Capitalism (1985) (The Free Press, New York) Google Scholar
  • Yelle L. E. The learning curve: Historical review and comprehensive survey. Decision Sci. (1979) 10(2):302–328CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Zaheer A., Venkatraman N. Relational governance as an interorganizational strategy: An empirical test of the role of trust in economic exchange. Strategic Management J. (1995) 16(5):373–392CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Zahra S. A., George G. Absorptive capacity: A review, reconceptualization, and extension. Acad. Management Rev. (2002) 27(2):185–203CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Zollo M., Singh H. Deliberate learning in corporate acquisitions: Post-acquisition strategies and integration capability in U.S. bank mergers. Strategic Management J. (2004) 25(13):1233–1256CrossrefGoogle Scholar
  • Zollo M., Winter S. G. Deliberate learning and the evolution of dynamic capabilities. Organ. Sci. (2002) 13(3):339–351LinkGoogle Scholar
  • Zollo M., Reuer J. J., Singh H. Interorganizational routines and performance in strategic alliances. Organ. Sci. (2002) 13(6):701–713LinkGoogle Scholar
INFORMS site uses cookies to store information on your computer. Some are essential to make our site work; Others help us improve the user experience. By using this site, you consent to the placement of these cookies. Please read our Privacy Statement to learn more.