When Do Firms Crack Under Pressure? Legal Professionals, Negative Role Models, and Organizational Misconduct

References

• Abbott A (1988) The System of Professions (University of Chicago Press, Chicago).Crossref, Google Scholar
• Agnew R (1985) A revised strain theory of delinquency. Social Forces 64(1):151–167.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Agnew R (2012) Reflection on “A revised strain theory of delinquency.” Social Forces 91(1):33–38.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Agnew R (2015) Strain, economic status, and crime. The Handbook of Criminological Theory (Wiley-Blackwell, Oxford), 209–229.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Agnew R, Piquero NL, Cullen FT (2009) General strain theory and white-collar crime. Simpson SS, Weisburd D, eds. The Criminology of White-Collar Crime (Springer, New York), 35–60.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Akerlof GA, Romer PM (1993) Looting: The economic underworld of bankruptcy for profit. Brookings Papers Econom. Activity (2):1–60.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Allison PD (2009) Fixed Effects Regression Models, Quantitative Applications in the Social Sciences, vol. 160 (SAGE Publications, Thousand Oaks, CA).Crossref, Google Scholar
• Anteby M, Chan CK, DiBenigno J (2016) Three lenses on occupations and professions in organizations: Becoming, doing, and relating. Acad. Management Ann. 10(1):183–244.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Bandura A (1977) Social Learning Theory (Prentice Hall, Englewood Cliffs, NJ).Google Scholar
• Battilana J, Dorado S (2010) Building sustainable hybrid organizations: The case of commercial microfinance organizations. Acad. Management J. 53(6):1419–1440.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Baum JA, Dahlin KB (2007) Aspiration performance and railroads’ patterns of learning from train wrecks and crashes. Organ. Sci. 18(3):368–385.Link, Google Scholar
• Baum JA, Rowley TJ, Shipilov AV, Chuang YT (2005) Dancing with strangers: Aspiration performance and the search for underwriting syndicate partners. Admin. Sci. Quart. 50(4):536–575.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Beatty RP, Zajac EJ (1994) Managerial incentives, monitoring, and risk bearing: A study of executive compensation, ownership, and board structure in initial public offerings. Admin. Sci. Quart. 39(2):313–335.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Becker HS (1963) Outsiders: Studies in the Sociology of Deviance (Free Press, New York).Google Scholar
• Beckman CM, Haunschild PR (2002) Network learning: The effects of partners’ heterogeneity of experience on corporate acquisitions. Admin. Sci. Quart. 47(1):92–124.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Benton R, Cobb JA (2019) Eyes on the horizon? Fragmented elites and short-term focus of the American corporation. Amer. J. Sociol. 124(6):1631–1684.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Bermiss YS, Zajac EJ, King BG (2014) Under construction: How commensuration and management fashion affect corporate reputation rankings. Organ. Sci. 25(2):591–608.Link, Google Scholar
• Burns N, Kedia S (2006) The impact of performance-based compensation on misreporting. J. Financial Econom. 79(1):35–67.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Calavita K, Tillman R, Pontell HN (1997) The savings and loan debacle, financial crime, and the state. Annu. Rev. Sociol. 23(1):19–38.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Chin MK, Hambrick DC, Treviño LK (2013) Political ideologies of CEOs: The influence of executives’ values on corporate social responsibility. Admin. Sci. Quart. 58(2):197–232.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Chandler D, Hwang H (2015) Learning from learning theory: A model of organizational adoption strategies at the microfoundations of institutional theory. J. Management 41(5):1446–1476.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Christensen DM (2015) Corporate accountability reporting and high-profile misconduct. Accounting Rev. 91(2):377–399.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Culp DR (1994) Law school: A mortuary for poets and moral reason. Campbell L. Rev. 16:61.Google Scholar
• Cyert RM, March JG (1963) A Behavioral Theory of the Firm, 2nd ed. (Blackwell Publishers, Malden, MA).Google Scholar
• Dai H, Dietvorst BJ, Tuckfield B, Milkman KL, Schweitzer ME(2018) Quitting when the going gets tough: A downside of high performance expectations. Acad. Management J. 61(5):1667–1691.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Daily CM, Dalton DR, Cannella AA Jr (2003) Corporate governance: Decades of dialogue and data. Acad. Management Rev. 28(3):371–382.Crossref, Google Scholar
• den Nieuwenboer NA, Cunha JVD, Treviño LK (2017). Middle managers and corruptive routine translation: The social production of deceptive performance. Organ. Sci. 28(5):781–803.Google Scholar
• DiBenigno J (2018) Anchored personalization in managing goal conflict between professional groups: The case of U.S. Army mental health care. Admin. Sci. Quart. 63(3):526–569.Crossref, Google Scholar
• DiMaggio PJ, Powell WW (1983) The iron cage revisited: Institutional isomorphism and collective rationality in organizational fields. Amer. Sociol. Rev. 48(2):147–160.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Dobbin F (2009) Inventing Equal Opportunity (Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ).Crossref, Google Scholar
• Dobbin F, Zorn D (2005) Corporate malfeasance and the myth of shareholder value. Davis DE, ed. Political Power and Social Theory, vol. 17 (Emerald Group Publishing, Ltd., Bingley, UK), 179–198.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Dobbin F, Kim S, Kalev A (2011) You can’t always get what you need: Organizational determinants of diversity programs. Amer. Sociol. Rev. 76(3):386–411.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Dobbin F, Simmons B, Garrett G (2007) The global diffusion of public policies: Social construction, coercion, competition, or learning? Annu. Rev. Sociol. 33:449–472.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Dorobantu S, Henisz WJ, Nartey L (2017) Not all sparks light a fire: Stakeholder and shareholder reactions to critical events in contested markets. Admin. Sci. Quart. 62(3):561–597.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Durkheim E (1964) The Rules of Sociological Method (Free Press, New York).Google Scholar
• Edelman LB, Uggen C, Erlanger HS (1999) The endogeneity of legal regulation: Grievance procedures as rational myth. Amer. J. Sociol. 105(2):406–454.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Edelman LB, Krieger LH, Eliason SR, Albiston CR, Mellema V (2011) When organizations rule: Judicial deference to institutionalized employment structures. Amer. J. Sociol. 117(3):888–954.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Espeland WN, Sauder M (2016) Engines of Anxiety: Academic Rankings, Reputation, and Accountability (Russell Sage Foundation, New York).Google Scholar
• Finkel SE (1995) Causal Analysis with Panel Data (Sage, Thousand Oaks, CA).Crossref, Google Scholar
• Finkelstein S (1992) Power in top management teams: Dimensions, measurement, and validation. Acad. Management J. 35:505–538.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Fligstein N (1993) The Transformation of Corporate Control (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA).Google Scholar
• Fligstein N, Roehrkasse AF (2016) The causes of fraud in the financial crisis of 2007 to 2009: Evidence from the mortgage-backed securities industry. Amer. Sociol. Rev. 81(4):617–643.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Gabbioneta C, Greenwood R, Mazzola P, Minoja M (2013) The influence of the institutional context on corporate illegality. Accounting Organ. Soc. 38(6-7):484–504.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Gavetti G, Levinthal D, Ocasio W (2007) Perspective—Neo-Carnegie: The Carnegie School’s past, present, and reconstructing for the future. Organ. Sci. 18(3):523–536.Link, Google Scholar
• Geweke J, Meese R, Dent W (1983) Comparing alternative tests of causality in temporal systems: Analytic results and experimental evidence. J. Econometrics 21(2):161–194.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Gibson DE (2003) Developing the professional self-concept: Role model construals in early, middle, and late career stages. Organ. Sci. 14(5):591–610.Link, Google Scholar
• Gioia DA, Manz CC (1985) Linking cognition and behavior: A script processing interpretation of vicarious learning. Acad. Management Rev. 10(3):527–539.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Glynn MA, Abzug R (2002) Institutionalizing identity: Symbolic isomorphism and organizational names. Acad. Management J. 45(1):267–280.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Graffin SD, Bundy J, Porac JF, Wade JB, Quinn DP (2013) Falls from grace and the hazards of high status: The 2009 British MP expense scandal and its impact on parliamentary elites. Admin. Sci. Quart. 58(3):313–345.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Grant DS, Bergesen AJ, Jones AW (2002) Organizational size and pollution: The case of the U.S. chemical industry. Amer. Sociol. Rev. 67(3):389–407.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Greenwood R, Hinings CR (1996) Understanding radical organizational change: Bringing together the old and the new institutionalism. Acad. Management Rev. 21(4):1022–1054.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Greenwood R, Raynard M, Kodeih F, Micelotta ER, Lounsbury M(2011) Institutional complexity and organizational responses. Acad. Management Ann. 5(1):317–371.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Greve HR (1998) Performance, aspirations and risky organizational change. Admin. Sci. Quart. 43(1):58–86.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Greve HR (2003) Organizational Learning from Performance Feedback: A Behavioral Perspective on Innovation and Change (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK).Crossref, Google Scholar
• Greve HR, Palmer D, Pozner JE (2010) Organizations gone wild: The causes, processes, and consequences of organizational misconduct. Acad. Management Ann. 4(1):53–107.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Haunschild P, Chandler D (2008) Institutional-level learning: Learning as a source of institutional change. The SAGE Handbook of Organizational Institutionalism (SAGE Publications, London), 624–649.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Haveman HA (1993) Follow the leader: Mimetic isomorphism and entry into new markets. Admin. Sci. Quart. 38(4):593–627.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Henisz WJ, Delios A (2001) Uncertainty, imitation, and plant location: Japanese multinational corporations, 1990–1996. Admin. Sci. Quart. 46(3):443–475.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Hirsh JB, Lu JG, Galinsky AD (2018) Moral utility theory: Understanding the motivation to behave (un) ethically. Res. Organ. Behav. 38:43–59.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Hirsch PM, Andrews JAY (1984) Administrators’ response to performance and value challenges: Stance, symbols, and behavior. Sergiovanni JE, ed. Leadership and Organizational Culture (University of Illinois Press, Urbana, IL).Google Scholar
• Hoetker G (2007) The use of logit and probit models in strategic management research: Critical issues. Strategic Management J. 28(4):331–343.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Jensen MC, Meckling WH (1976). Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure. J. Financial Econom. 3(4):305–360.Google Scholar
• Jonsson S, Greve HR, Fujiwara-Greve T (2009) Undeserved loss: The spread of legitimacy loss to innocent organizations in response to reported corporate deviance. Admin. Sci. Quart. 54(2):195–228.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Kacperczyk A (2009) With greater power comes greater responsibility? Takeover protection and corporate attention to stakeholders. Strategic Management J. 30(3):261–285.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Kedia S, Rajgopal S (2011) Do the SEC’s enforcement preferences affect corporate misconduct? J. Accounting Econom. 51(3):259–278.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Kennedy D (1982) Legal education and the reproduction of hierarchy. J. Legal Ed. 32:591.Google Scholar
• Khurana R (2010) From higher aims to hired hands. In From Higher Aims to Hired Hands (Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ).Google Scholar
• Kim JY, Miner AS (2007) Vicarious learning from the failures and near-failures of others: Evidence from the U.S. commercial banking industry. Acad. Management J. 50(3):687–714.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Kraatz MS (1998) Learning by association? Interorganizational networks and adaptation to environmental change. Acad. Management J. 41(6):621–643.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Kraatz M, Block ES (2017) Institutional pluralism revisited. Greenwood R, Oliver C, Lawrence T, Meyer R, eds. The SAGE Handbook of Organizational Institutionalism (SAGE Publications, London), 635–662.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Lim EN, McCann BT (2014) Performance feedback and firm risk taking: The moderating effects of CEO and outside director stock options. Organ. Sci. 25(1):262–282.Link, Google Scholar
• Lyócsa Š, Výrost T, Baumohl E (2019) Social aspirations in European banks: Peer-influenced risk behaviour. Appl. Econom. Lett. 26(6):473–479.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Maguire S, Hardy C, Lawrence TB (2004) Institutional entrepreneurship in emerging fields: HIV/AIDS treatment advocacy in Canada. Acad. Management J. 47(5):657–679.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Manz CC, Sims HP Jr (1981) Vicarious learning: The influence of modeling on organizational behavior. Acad. Management Rev. 6(1):105–113.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Marquis C, Tilcsik A (2016) Institutional equivalence: How industry and community peers influence corporate philanthropy. Organ. Sci. 27(5):1325–1341.Link, Google Scholar
• Mazmanian M, Beckman CM (2018) “Making” your numbers: Engendering organizational control through a ritual of quantification. Organ. Sci. 29(3):357–379.Link, Google Scholar
• McDonnell M-H, King BG (2018) Order in the court: How firm status and reputation shape the outcomes of employment discrimination suits. Amer. Sociol. Rev. 83(1):61–87.Crossref, Google Scholar
• McPherson CM, Sauder M (2013) Logics in action: Managing institutional complexity in a drug court. Admin. Sci. Quart. 58(2):165–196.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Menkel-Meadow CJ (2012) Too many lawyers? Or should lawyers be doing other things? Internat. J. Legal Profession 19(2–3):147–173.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Merton RK (1938) Social structure and anomie. Amer. Sociol. Rev. 3:672–682.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Mertz E (2007) The Language of Law School: Learning to “Think Like a Lawyer” (Oxford University Press, New York).Crossref, Google Scholar
• Meyer JW, Rowan B (1977) Institutionalized organizations: Formal structure as myth and ceremony. Amer. J. Sociol. 83(2):340–363.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Mishina Y, Dykes BJ, Block ES, Pollock TG (2010) Why “good” firms do bad things: The effects of high aspirations, high expectations, and prominence on the incidence of corporate illegality. Acad. Management J. 53(4):701–722.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Mizruchi MS, Marshall LJ II (2016) Corporate CEOs, 1890–2015: Titans, bureaucrats, and saviors. Annu. Rev. Sociol. 42:143–163.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Mohliver A (2018) How misconduct spreads: Auditors’ role in the diffusion of stock-option backdating. Admin. Sci. Quart. 64(2):310–336.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Muzio D, Faulconbridge J, Gabbioneta C, Greenwood R (2016) Bad apples, bad barrels and bad cellars: A ‘boundaries’ perspective on professional misconduct. Palmer D, Greenwood R, Smith-Crowe K, eds. Organizational Wrongdoing (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK), 141–175.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Nance CE (2011) The value of law degree. Iowa Law Rev. 96(5): 1629–1648.Google Scholar
• Nelson RL, Nielsen LB (2000) Cops, counsel, and entrepreneurs: Constructing the role of inside counsel in large corporations. Law Soc. Rev. 34(2):457–494.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Ocasio W (1994) Political dynamics and the circulation of power: CEO succession in U.S. industrial corporations, 1960–1990. Admin. Sci. Quart. 39(2):285–312.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Occhiuto N (2020) The legitimacy of corporate political activity and its varied influence on public policy: The case of transportation network companies in New York, Chicago, and Austin. Working paper, EMLYON Business School, Lyon, France.Google Scholar
• Oliver C (1991) Strategic responses to institutional processes. Acad. Management Rev. 16(1):145–179.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Pache AC, Santos F (2010) When worlds collide: The internal dynamics of organizational responses to conflicting institutional demands. Acad. Management Rev. 35(3):455–476.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Palmer D (2017) Institutions, institutional theory and organizational wrongdoing. Greenwood R, Oliver C, Lawrence T, Meyer R, eds. The SAGE Handbook of Organizational Institutionalism (SAGE Publications, London), 737–758.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Palmer D, Yenkey CB (2015) Drugs, sweat, and gears: An organizational analysis of performance-enhancing drug use in the 2010 Tour de France. Soc. Forces 94(2):891–922.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Palmer D, Greenwood R, Smith-Crowe K, eds. (2016) Organizational Wrongdoing: Key Perspectives and New Directions (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK).Crossref, Google Scholar
• Palmer DA, Jennings PD, Zhou X (1993) Late adoption of the multidivisional form by large U.S. corporations: Institutional, political, and economic accounts. Admin. Sci. Quart. 38(1):100–131.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Perez-Aleman P (2011) Collective learning in global diffusion: Spreading quality standards in a developing country cluster. Organ. Sci. 22(1):173–189.Link, Google Scholar
• Pernell K, Jung J, Dobbin F (2017) The hazards of expert control: Chief risk officers and risky derivatives. Amer. Sociol. Rev. 82(3):511–541.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Piazza A, Jourdan J (2017) When the dust settles: The consequences of scandals for organizational competition. Acad. Management J. 61(1):165–190.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Pitcher P, Smith AD (2001) Top management team heterogeneity: Personality, power, and proxies. Organ. Sci. 12(1):1–18.Link, Google Scholar
• Powell WW, Rerup C (2017) Opening the black box: The microfoundations of institutions. Greenwood R, Oliver C, Sahlin K, Suddaby R, eds. The SAGE Handbook of Organizational Institutionalism (Sage, London), 311–337.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Rao H, Greve HR, Davis GF (2001) Fool’s gold: Social proof in the initiation and abandonment of coverage by Wall Street analysts. Admin. Sci. Quart. 46(3):502–526.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Short JL, Toffel MW (2010) Making self-regulation more than merely symbolic: The critical role of the legal environment. Admin. Sci. Quart. 55(3):361–396.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Sine WD, David RJ (2003) Environmental jolts, institutional change, and the creation of entrepreneurial opportunity in the U.S. electric power industry. Res. Policy 32(2):185–207.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Soltes E (2016) Why They Do It: Inside the Mind of the White-Collar Criminal (PublicAffairs, New York).Google Scholar
• Strang D, Macy MW (2001) In search of excellence: Fads, success stories, and adaptive emulation. Amer. J. Sociol. 107(1):147–182.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Strang D, Soule SA (1998) Diffusion in organizations and social movements: From hybrid corn to poison pills. Annu. Rev. Sociol. 24(1):265–290.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Suddaby R, Greenwood R (2005) Rhetorical strategies of legitimacy. Admin. Sci. Quart. 50(1):35–67.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Sullivan BN, Haunschild P, Page K (2007) Organizations non gratae? The impact of unethical corporate acts on interorganizational networks. Organ. Sci. 18(1):55–70.Link, Google Scholar
• Tamanaha BZ (2012) Failing Law Schools (University of Chicago Press, Chicago).Crossref, Google Scholar
• Tenbrunsel AE, Smith‐Crowe K (2008) 13. Ethical decision making: Where we’ve been and where we’re going. Acad. Management Ann. 2(1):545–607.Google Scholar
• Thornton M (2012) The new knowledge economy and the transformation of the law discipline. Internat. J. Legal Profession 19(2–3):265–281.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Thornton M (2014) Legal education in the corporate university. Annual Rev. Law and Social Sci. 10:19–35.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Thornton PH (2004) Markets from Culture: Institutional Logics and Organizational Decisions in Higher Education Publishing (Stanford University Press, Redwood City, CA).Crossref, Google Scholar
• Thornton PH, Ocasio W (1999) Institutional logics and the historical contingency of power in organizations: Executive succession in the higher education publishing industry, 1958–1990. Amer. J. Sociol. 105(3):801–843.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Treviño LK, Den Nieuwenboer NA, Kish-Gephart JJ (2014) (Un)ethical behavior in organizations. Annu. Rev. Psych. 65:635–660.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Useem M (1996) Investor Capitalism: How Money Managers Are Changing the Face of Corporate America (Basic Books, New York).Google Scholar
• Vaughan D (1985) Controlling Unlawful Organizational Behavior: Social Structure and Corporate Misconduct (University of Chicago Press, Chicago).Google Scholar
• Vuori TO, Huy QN (2016) Distributed attention and shared emotions in the innovation process: How Nokia lost the smartphone battle. Admin. Sci. Quart. 61(1):9–51.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Werner T (2019) General counsel power and firm engagement in corporate political activity. Working paper, McCombs School of Business, University of Texas, Austin, TX.Google Scholar
• White R (2011) Transnational Environmental Crime. Toward an Eco-Global Criminology (Routledge, London).Google Scholar
• Wooten ME, Hoffman AJ (2017) Organizational fields: Past, present and future. Greenwood R, Oliver C, Lawrence T, Meyer RE, eds. Sage Handbook of Organizational Institutionalism, 2nd ed. (Sage Publications, London), 55–74.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Xu D, Zhou KZ, Du F (2019) Deviant vs. aspirational risk taking: The effects of performance feedback on bribery expenditure and R&D intensity. Acad. Management J. 62(4):1226–1251.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Yiu DW, Xu Y, Wan WP (2014) The deterrence effects of vicarious punishments on corporate financial fraud. Organ. Sci. 25(5):1549–1571.Link, Google Scholar
• Zavyalova A, Pfarrer MD, Reger RK, Shapiro DL (2012) Managing the message: The effects of firm actions and industry spillovers on media coverage following wrongdoing. Acad. Management J. 55(5):1079–1101.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Zelner BA (2009) Using simulation to interpret results from logit, probit, and other nonlinear models. Strategic Management J. 30(12):1335–1348.Crossref, Google Scholar
• Zietsma C, Lawrence TB (2010) Institutional work in the transformation of an organizational field: The interplay of boundary work and practice work. Admin. Sci. Quart. 55(2):189–221.Crossref, Google Scholar