Diversification and the Legal Organization of the Firm

References

• Amihud Y. , Lev B. Risk reduction as a managerial motive for conglomerate mergers. Bell J. Econom. (1981) 12 2 605 617 Crossref, Google Scholar
• Argyres N. Capabilities, technological diversification, and divisionalization. Strategic Management J. (1996) 17 395 410 Crossref, Google Scholar
• Armour H. , Teece D. Organizational structure and economic performance. Bell J. Econom. (1978) 9 106 122 Crossref, Google Scholar
• Aron D. Ability, moral hazard, firm size and diversification. Rand J. Econom. (1988) 19 1 72 87 Crossref, Google Scholar
• Barney J. , Edwards F. , Ringleb A. Organizational responses to legal liability: Employee exposure to hazardous materials, vertical integration, and small firm production. Acad. Management J. (1992) 35 2 328 349 Crossref, Google Scholar
• Black F. , Scholes M. The pricing of options and corporate liabilities. J. Political Econom. (1973) 81 637 659 Crossref, Google Scholar
• Blumberg P. The Law of Corporate Groups: Procedural Problems in the Law of Parent and Subsidiary Corporations (1983) (Little, Brown, Boston, MA) Google Scholar
• Blumberg P. Limited liability and corporate groups. J. Corporation Law (1986) 11 Summer 573 631 Google Scholar
• Bowman N. , Hurry D. Strategy through the option lens: An integrated view of resource investments and incrementalchoice processes. Acad. Management Rev. (1993) 18 760 782 Crossref, Google Scholar
• Chandler A. D. Strategy and Organization (1962) (MIT Press, Cambridge MA) Google Scholar
• Coffee J. Shareholders versus managers: The strain in the corporate web. Michigan Law Rev. (1986) 85 1 109 Crossref, Google Scholar
• Comment R. , Jarrell G. Corporate focus and stock returns. J. Financial Econom. (1995) 37 67 88 Crossref, Google Scholar
• Demsetz H. Toward a theory of property rights. Amer. Econom. Rev. (1967) 57 347 359 Google Scholar
• Donaldson T. , Preston L. The stakeholder theory of the corporation: Concepts, evidence, and implications. Acad. Management Rev. (1995) 20 65 91 Crossref, Google Scholar
• Easterbrook F. , Fischel D. Limited liability and the corporation. Univ. Chicago Law Rev. (1985) 52 89 117 Crossref, Google Scholar
• Fama E. , Jensen M. Separation of ownership and control. J. Law and Econom. (1983) 26 301 325 Crossref, Google Scholar
• Freeman R. Strategic Management: A Stakeholder Approach (1984) (Pitman, Boston, MA) Google Scholar
• Galai D. , Masulis R. The options pricing model and the risk factor of stocks. J. Financial Econom. (1976) 3 1/2 53 81 Crossref, Google Scholar
• Gerlach M. Alliance Capitalism: The Social Network of Japanese Business (1993) (University of California Press, Berkeley, CA) Google Scholar
• Gilson R. Corporate governance and economic efficiency: When do institutions matter? (1995) . Working paper #121, Stanford Law School, Stanford, CA Google Scholar
• Halpern P. , Trebilcock M. , Turnbull S. An economic analysis of limited liability in corporation law. Univ. Toronto Law J. (1980) 30 117 150 Crossref, Google Scholar
• Hill C. Internal organization and enterprise performance: Some UK evidence. Managerial and Decision Econom. (1984) 6 210 216 Crossref, Google Scholar
• Hill C. Internal capital market controls and financial performance in multidivisional firms. J. Indust. Econom. (1988) 37 67 83 Crossref, Google Scholar
• Hill C. , Hoskisson R. Strategy and structure in the multiproduct firm. Acad. Management Rev. (1987) 12 331 341 . 1987 Crossref, Google Scholar
• Holderness C. , Sheehan D. Raiders or saviors? the evidence on six controversial investors. J. Financial Econom. (1985) 14 555 579 Crossref, Google Scholar
• Hoskisson R. Multidivisional structure and performance: The contingency of diversification strategy. Acad. Management J. (1987) 30 625 644 Crossref, Google Scholar
• Hoskisson R. , Hitt M. , Hill C. Managerial incentives and investment in R&D in large multiproduct firms. Organ. Sci. (1993) 4 2 325 341 Link, Google Scholar
• Huber P. Liability: The Legal Revolution and Its Consequences (1988) (Basic Books, New York) Google Scholar
• Jensen M. Corporate control and the politics of finance. J. Appl. Corporate Finance (1991) 6 3 13 Google Scholar
• Jensen M. The modern industrial revolution, exit, and the failure of internal control systems. J. Finance (1993) 48 3 831 880 Crossref, Google Scholar
• Jensen M. , Murphy K. Performance pay and top management incentives. J. Political Econom. (1990) 98 225 264 Crossref, Google Scholar
• Kerr J. Diversification strategies and managerial rewards: An empirical study. Acad. Management J. (1985) 28 155 179 Crossref, Google Scholar
• Lehn K. , Poulsen A. The contractual resolution of bondholder-stockholder conflicts in leveraged buyouts. J. Law and Econom. (1991) 34 645 673 Crossref, Google Scholar
• Llewellen W. A pure financial rationale for conglomerate mergers. J. Finance (1971) 26 521 537 Crossref, Google Scholar
• Lubatkin M. Merger strategies and stockholder value. Strategic Management J. (1987) 8 39 53 Crossref, Google Scholar
• Manne H. Mergers and the market for corporate control. J. Political Econom. (1965) 77 110 120 Crossref, Google Scholar
• Markides C. C. Diversification, restructuring, and economic performance. Strategic Management J. (1995) 16 219 236 Crossref, Google Scholar
• Masten S. Towards a legal theory of the firm. J. Law Econom. Organ. (1988) 4 3 47 Google Scholar
• Matsusaka J. Takeover motives during the conglomerate merger wave. RAND J. Econom. (1993) 24 357 379 Crossref, Google Scholar
• McDaniel M. Bondholders and stockholders. J. Corporation Law (1988) 13 205 315 Google Scholar
• Meiners R. , Mofsky J. , Tollison R. Piercing the veil of limited liability. Delaware J. Corporate Law (1979) 4 351 367 Google Scholar
• Montgomery C. Corporate diversification. J. Econom. Perspectives (1994) 8 623 632 Crossref, Google Scholar
• Morck R. , Shleiter A. , Vishny R. Do managerial motives drive bad acquisitions? J. Finance (1990) 45 31 48 Crossref, Google Scholar
• Nayyar P. On the measurement of corporate diversification strategy: Evidence from large U.S. service firms. Strategic Management J. (1992) 8 219 235 Crossref, Google Scholar
• Panzar J. , Willig R. Economies of scope. Amer. Econom. Rev. (1981) 71 268 272 Google Scholar
• Phillips-Patrick F. Political risk and organization form. J. Law and Econom. (1991) 34 675 693 Crossref, Google Scholar
• Posner R. The rights of creditors of affiliated corporations. Univ. Chicago Law Rev. (1976) 43 499 526 Crossref, Google Scholar
• Pound J. Proxy contests and the efficiency of shareholder oversight. J. Financial Econom. (1988) 20 237 265 Crossref, Google Scholar
• Pound J. Beyond takeovers: Politics comes to the organization of corporate control. Harvard Bus. Rev. (1992) 70 83 93 Google Scholar
• Priest G. The modern expansion of tort liability. J. Econom. Perspectives (1991) 5 31 50 Crossref, Google Scholar
• Roe M. Bankruptcy and mass tort. Columbia Law Rev. (1984) 84 846 849 Crossref, Google Scholar
• Rumelt R. Strategy, Structure, and Economic Performance (1974) (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA) Google Scholar
• Schwartz A. Product liability, corporate structure, and bankruptcy: Toxic substances and the remote risk relationship. J. Legal Stud. (1985) 14 689 750 Crossref, Google Scholar
• Sharpe W. A simplified model of portfolio analysis. Management Sci. (1963) 9 277 293 Link, Google Scholar
• Shleiter A. , Vishny R. Large shareholders and corporate control. J. Political Econom. (1986) 94 461 488 Crossref, Google Scholar
• Singh H. , Montgomery C. Corporate acquisition strategy and economic performance. Strategic Management J. (1987) 8 377 386 Crossref, Google Scholar
• Smith C. , Warner J. On financial contracting: An analysis of bond covenants. J. Financial Econom. (1979) 7 117 161 Crossref, Google Scholar
• Teece D. Economies of scope and the scope of the enterprise. J. Econom. Behavior and Organ. (1980) 1 223 247 Crossref, Google Scholar
• Titman S. The effects of capital organization on a firm's liquidation decision. J. Financial Econom. (1984) 13 137 151 Crossref, Google Scholar
• Tricker R. Corporate Governance (1984) (Gower Press, Aldershot, England) Google Scholar
• Viscusi W. Product and organizational liability. J. Econom. Perspectives (1991) 5 71 91 Crossref, Google Scholar
• Westphal J. , Zajac E. Who shall govern? CEO/board power, demographic similarity, and new director selection. Admin. Sci. Quart. (1995) 40 60 83 Crossref, Google Scholar
• Williamson O. Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust Implications (1975) (Free Press, New York) Google Scholar
• Williamson O. Comparative economic organization: The analysis of discrete structural alternatives. Admin. Sci. Quart. (1991) 36 269 296 Crossref, Google Scholar